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SYMPOSIUM FEATURE
MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19
Brian JM Quinn *
The conventional wisdom is that MAE/MACs in merger agreements provide an opportunity for buyers to renegotiate merger
agreements in the event of intervening adverse events. However,
the experience following the COVID-19 outbreak suggests that the
conventional wisdom is incorrect or at least overstated. In fact,
MAE/MACs shift the risk of exogenous adverse events (like
COVID-19) to buyers while leaving only the risks of adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous events with the seller. The consequence of this risk-shifting is to strictly limit the circumstances
under which a buyer can credibly lean on a MAE/MAC to threaten
to terminate a merger agreement and initiate a renegotiation. Parties to merger agreements appear to have internalized that lesson,
as demonstrated by the relative paucity of renegotiations in the
immediate aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak.
INTRODUCTION
On May 20, 2020, Forescout Technologies filed a lawsuit seeking
a declaratory judgment against Advent International.1 Forescout
and Advent had signed a merger agreement in early February,
some three months before.2 By May, it was becoming apparent to

* Associate Professor of Law, Boston College Law School. Many thanks to Ms. Jihoo
Kim for her valuable research assistance.
1. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout Commences Litigation Against Advent International (May 20, 2020, 8:00 AM ET) [hereinafter Press Release, Forescout Litigation],
https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/05/20/2036337/0/en/Forescout-Commen
ces-Litigation-Against-Advent-International.html [https://perma.cc/5GCT-KQFR].
2. Id.
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Forescout that Advent was suffering buyer’s remorse: a deal that
looked good prior to the onset of a global pandemic looked less wonderful after the U.S. economy ground to a halt in an effort to battle
the spread of COVID-19. Forescout’s lawsuit sought a declaratory
judgment from the court that COVID-19 did not represent a material adverse event and an order that Advent proceed to closing of
the transaction.3 Ultimately, Forescout and Advent settled the litigation through a renegotiation downwards of the merger price and
the transaction moved forward to closing.4 The Forescout litigation
was one of a small number of cases that followed the onset of
COVID-19 in the spring of 2020 in which buyers sought to walk
away from merger agreements citing a material adverse effect.5
While the Forescout story is consistent at first glance with the conventional wisdom that parties use material adverse effect/material
adverse change (“MAE/MAC”) clauses in merger agreements to facilitate renegotiation, the paucity of such efforts following the
COVID-19 outbreak should cause us to re-evaluate that conventional wisdom.6 This Article argues that the ambiguity that often
serves the corporation law well has, by now, dissipated with respect to MAE/MAC clauses, and there has been a fundamental
change in the role of the MAE/MAC since 2001. The lack of ambiguity surrounding modern MAE/MAC clauses has, as a result, fundamentally changed the role MAE/MAC clauses play in merger
agreements. Rather than act as a quasi-force majeure clause, with
the seller bearing the burden of adverse shock, modern MAE/MAC
clauses allocate exogenous risks to the buyer and endogenous risks
to the seller consistent with the role described by Professors Gilson
and Schwartz.7 Consequently, conventional wisdom that describes
3. Id.
4. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout and Advent International Reach Amended
Merger Agreement (July 15, 2020, 9:00 AM ET) [hereinafter Press Release, Forescout
Amended Agreement], https://www.globenewswire.com/news-release/2020/07/15/2062619/0
/en/Forescout-and-Advent-International-Reach-Amended-Merger-Agreement.html [https://
perma.cc/8UA3-HV3A].
5. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Secretary Azar Declares Public Health Emergency for United States for 2019 Novel Coronavirus (Jan. 31, 2020) [hereinafter Press Release, Public Health Emergency], https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2020/01/31
/secretary-azar-declares-public-health-emergency-us-2019-novel-coronavirus.html [https://
perma.cc/WKN8-ZBRF].
6. The material adverse effect clause is also known as the material adverse change
clause. The two are fundamentally equivalent, and in this Article I will refer to them collectively as MAE/MAC clauses or provisions.
7. Ronald J. Gilson & Alan Schwartz, Understanding MACs: Moral Hazard in Acquisitions, 21 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 330, 357 (2005).
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MAE/MAC clauses as contractual devices that potentially facilitate
efficient renegotiations in the face of adverse shocks is overstated.8
The sudden onset of COVID-19 in spring 2020 was, and remains,
a tsunami-like event. It was totally unexpected and swept across
the economy with frightening speed. It also threatens to extend
well into the foreseeable future. COVID-19 is precisely the kind of
adverse event that the MAE/MAC clause in merger agreements is
intended to protect signatories against. The COVID-19 outbreak
gives us a unique opportunity to evaluate the role the MAE/MAC
clause plays in merger contracting. Most transactions pending at
the outset of the COVID-19 outbreak in the U.S. closed notwithstanding the massive disruption brought on by the pandemic. In a
small number of transactions, buyers refused to close, citing a
MAE/MAC as the reason not to move forward with the merger. In
three of those transactions, the parties sought to litigate the question of a MAE/MAC (i.e., Simon v. Taubman,9 LVMH v. Tiffany,10
and Forescout Technologies11), but ultimately settled their litigation by renegotiating the terms of their merger agreement. In Mirae’s acquisition of Anbang’s hotel assets, a court refused to declare
a MAE/MAC, but permitted the buyer to walk away for breach of a
seller’s covenant.12 In another transaction, the parties agreed to
terminate the transaction voluntarily (i.e., Victoria’s Secret13) rather than renegotiate or litigate the issue of whether there had
been a MAE/MAC.

8. The former Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court calls MAE/MAC clauses
“renegotiation clauses.” Allison Frankel, COVID-19 MAE Cases Keep Ending with Revised
Deals. That Wouldn’t Happen Without Litigation, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2020), https://www.
reuters.com/article/legal-us-otc-mae/covid-19-mae-cases-keep-ending-with-revised-deals-th
at-wouldnt-happen-without-litigation-idUSKBN27W2TH [https://perma.cc/2CL4-C4DM].
9. Complaint at 1–2, Simon Property Group, Inc. v. Taubman Centers, Inc., No. 2020181675-CB (Mich. Cir. Ct. June 10, 2020).
10. LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint at 2–3, Tiffany
& Co. v. LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, C.A. No. 2020-0768-JRS (Del. Ch. Sept.
28, 2020).
11. Press Release, Forescout Amended Agreement, supra note 4.
12. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL,
2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
13. Verified Complaint at 1, Sycamore Partners III, L.P. v. L Brands, Inc., No. 20200306, 2020 WL 2061416 (Del. Ch. Apr. 24, 2020); James Fontella-Khan & Sujeet Indap,
Sycamore and L Brands Call Off Victoria’s Secret Deal, FIN. TIMES (May 4, 2020),
https://www.ft.com/content/3f458e9c-e864-4fe1-8740-37136bae7b62 [https://perma.cc/94CS
-HSP5].
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The MAE/MAC provision is one of a number of risk-shifting
clauses in the merger contract. In most cases, the MAE/MAC does
this by assigning the risk of exogenous material adverse events between signing and closing to the buyer and the risk of endogenous
material adverse events to the seller.14 Because the MAE/MAC assigns the risk to the party best able to bear it, one can reasonably
conclude that the MAE/MAC is an efficient term. Where there has
been a MAE/MAC, the buyer is permitted to terminate the transaction and walk away, or the parties can renegotiate the terms of
the agreement in order to facilitate an efficient transaction. Where
there has been an adverse event that does not rise to a MAE, the
buyer bears the risk of loss. However, because the MAE/MAC provision can act as a fulcrum for potential efficient renegotiations,
the conventional wisdom is that the MAE/MAC provision has a
subsidiary function as a renegotiation clause in the face of any adverse shock.
By now, it is clear, however, that courts are extremely reticent
to permit a buyer to simply point to an adverse event between signing and closing and walk away from a transaction. Notwithstanding courts’ reluctance, the conventional wisdom remains that following an adverse event, a buyer may lean on these clauses, and
the threat of litigation, to push sellers to renegotiate the terms of
merger agreements. This conventional wisdom overestimates the
degree of judicial ambiguity surrounding modern MAE/MAC provisions. Where the parties overestimate judicial ambiguity, buyers
may be able to take advantage of bargaining dynamics to hold up
the seller and shift the cost of adverse shocks, at least in part, to
sellers rather than bear them themselves. Renegotiating in the absence of a true MAE/MAC represents an inefficient ex post distribution of transaction surplus.
This Article seeks to illustrate the role MAE/MACs play in the
merger agreement and understand how they may affect bargaining
dynamics that accompany renegotiations of merger agreements. In
particular, this Article adds to the literature on merger contracting
by observing that the conventional wisdom with respect to the role
played by MAE/MACs misapprehends the role of a modern
MAE/MAC provision.

14. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 339, 345–46 (observing the risk-shifting
traits of the MAE/MAC clause).
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This Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I situates
the discussion of the MAE/MAC as a lever for renegotiation by
providing an overview of the conventional wisdom with respect to
the role of MAE/MAC clauses following the occurrence of an adverse shock. Part II provides an overview of the MAE/MAC clause
in merger agreements, including an analysis of the work
MAE/MAC clauses are intended to accomplish in the contracting
process. Part III provides an overview of the current state of the
doctrine with respect to MAE/MAC clauses in Delaware. Part IV
discusses the experience of merger parties with renegotiations in
the wake of the COVID-19 outbreak. Specifically, this Part asks
why there were so few renegotiations following the outbreak and
how the conventional wisdom with respect to the role of MAE/MAC
in renegotiations misapprehends its role. Finally, Part V summarizes and concludes.
I. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM: MAE/MACS AS RENEGOTIATION
CLAUSES
The conventional wisdom holds that MAE/MAC clauses in merger agreements act as a fulcrum for efficient renegotiations in the
face of adverse shocks between signing and closing. When faced
with an adverse event that affects a seller’s valuation, buyers may
point to a MAE/MAC clause in an attempt to credibly threaten to
terminate the transaction, thereby pushing sellers to agree to renegotiate the terms of the merger.
An example of such renegotiation during the COVID-19 pandemic involves private equity buyer Advent International’s acquisition of Forescout Technologies. Forescout and Advent signed
their merger agreement on February 6, 2020, with Advent paying
$33 per share in cash for Forescout.15 By the time they signed their
agreement, public health experts, though perhaps not the general
public, were already on the alert for the growing threat of the
COVID-19 outbreak in China. On January 31, 2020, the Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) had declared a National Public Health Emergency that empowered HHS to begin to
15. Press Release, Forescout, Forescout to Be Acquired by Advent International in $1.9
Billion Transaction (Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.forescout.com/company/news/press-releases
/forescout-to-be-acquired-by-advent-international-in-1.9-billion-transaction/ [https://perm
a.cc/W2M6-7ULY].
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respond to the threat of a pandemic in the U.S.16 It was not until
March 13, 2020, more than a month after Forescout and Advent
signed their agreement, that the President declared a National
Emergency with respect to COVID-19.17
By May, it was becoming apparent to Forescout that Advent was
suffering buyer’s remorse: a deal that looked good prior to the onset
of a global pandemic looked less wonderful after the U.S. economy
ground to a halt in an effort to battle the spread of COVID-19. Although Forescout had met all the conditions to closing the agreement, Advent dragged its feet and refused to close. On May 20,
2020, Forescout Technologies filed a lawsuit against Advent International seeking a declaratory judgment that the COVID-19 pandemic did not constitute a material adverse event under the merger agreement, as well as an order that Advent proceed and close
the transaction.18 The case was set for trial at the end of July 2020.
Ultimately, Forescout and Advent settled the litigation through a
renegotiation downwards of the merger price, and the transaction
moved forward to closing.19 Rather than go to trial, on July 15,
2020, Forescout and Advent agreed to an amended merger agreement. Under the renegotiated terms, Forescout shareholders
would receive $29/share (87% of the original deal price), and Advent would move to close the transaction.20
At first blush, an observer might attribute the successful renegotiation of the terms of the merger agreement to the effect of
COVID-19, but there is ultimately little or no reason to believe that
the pandemic was the cause. The parties had specifically carved
out of the definition of MAE/MAC any epidemic or pandemic. Although the onset of COVID-19 no doubt presented a challenge to
Forescout and its business going forward, the contract clearly assigned the risk of this kind of adverse shock to Advent, the buyer.
However, it subsequently came to light that in May 2020, during
the executory period, the acquirer received a “whistle-blower” e-

16. Press Release, Public Health Emergency, supra note 5.
17. Donald J. Trump, Proclamation on Declaring a National Emergency Concerning the
Novel Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Outbreak, WHITE HOUSE (Mar. 13, 2020), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/proclamation-declaring-national-emergency-conc
erning-novel-coronavirus-disease-covid-19-outbreak/ [https://perma.cc/3YTV-33PJ].
18. Press Release, Forescout Litigation, supra note 1.
19. Press Release, Forescout Amended Agreement, supra note 4.
20. Id.
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mail from an employee of Forescout alleging accounting improprieties within the company. Unlike COVID-19, the risk of adverse
internal shocks, like the disclosure of financial irregularities
within the company, were risks assigned to the seller and not the
buyer. Consequently, when Advent threatened to terminate the
merger agreement unless the parties could renegotiate the terms
due to disclosure of possible financial irregularities internal to
Forescout, Advent’s threat was credible.21 This fuller story of
Forescout and Advent is one that is recognizable to many in the
deal world. It reflects the conventional wisdom with respect to
MAE/MAC. However, it has little to do with the onset of COVID19. Nevertheless, the idea that MAE/MAC clauses can act as levers
for renegotiation of contracts following an adverse shock like
COVID-19 has taken hold amongst practitioners.22 Although
slightly more hedged, a view that a MAE/MAC can act as a lever
21. Dean Seal, Investors Sue Forescout over Nixed $1.9B Advent Takeover, LAW360
(June 11, 2020, 8:33 PM EDT), https://www.law360.com/articles/1281979/investors-sueforescout-over-nixed-1-9b-advent-takeover [https://perma.cc/NX5A-UH5A]; Luis Sanchez,
Why Forescout Is Taking a Much Lower Buyout Offer, MOTLEY FOOL (Aug. 4, 2020), https://
www.fool.com/investing/2020/08/04/why-forescout-is-taking-a-much-lower-buyout-offer.as
px [https://perma.cc/6AE3-4V3H].
22. Jessica DiNapoli, In Row with Tiffany, LVMH May Find That Most Sales Are Final,
REUTERS (Sept. 18, 2020, 7:32 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/tiffany-m-a-lvmh-dela
ware-analysis-idUSKBN2691Q8 [https://perma.cc/42KW-D4BR] (describing renegotiation
as an alternative to litigation); STEVEN M. BRAGG, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: A CONDENSED
PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE 173 (2009) (noting that a MAE may serve to facilitate renegotiation
of contract terms); Steven Davidoff Solomon, In Abbott’s Bid to Halt Purchase of Alere, the
MAC Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/07/
business/dealbook/abbott-laboratories-alere-mac-clause.html
[https://perma.cc/8N7N-D5
3W] (“MAC assertions were really part of the negotiation dynamic among the parties as the
financial crisis took hold. A buyer can invoke a MAC clause to try to drive down the price of
an acquisition by taking advantage of either changed market conditions or adverse events
affecting the target company.”); Nick Brown, Cerberus Seeks Lower Price on Innkeepers,
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2011), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-innkeepers/cerberus-seekslower-price-on-innkeepers-sources-idUSTRE77N5MC20110824 [https://perma.cc/QA2R-88
68] (“Most likely, Miller said, both sides will reopen talks and settle on a new takeover price,
especially given that Cerberus and Chatham have already done due diligence.”); Abigail
Hathaway, Buyer’s Remorse and “MAC Outs” in M&A Agreements, CLS BLUE SKY BLOG
(Mar. 18, 2016), https://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2016/03/18/buyers-remorse-and-macouts-in-ma-agreements/ [https://perma.cc/P64Z-S9Y9]; Revisiting the MAC Clause in Transaction Agreements: What Can Counsel Learn from the Credit Crisis?, A.B.A. (Aug. 20,
2010), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/business_law/publications/blt/2010/08/03_her
man/ [https://perma.cc/64M3-W2RB]; 1 ABA MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH
COMMENTARY 268 (Murray Perelman ed., 2d ed. 2010) (explaining that a buyer may prefer
a price renegotiation rather than engaging in costly litigation over a MAE); Eric L. Talley,
On Uncertainty, Ambiguity, and Contractual Conditions, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 755, 788 (2009)
(“A number of practitioners . . . suggested that, in addition to concerns about uncertainty,
one of the key reasons for a MAC/MAE provision is to provide a backdrop for possible deal
restructuring should market conditions change.”).
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to facilitate efficient renegotiation is by now widely accepted by academics (the present author is not excluded from that number).23
The conventional wisdom posits the MAE/MAC clause as a fulcrum for renegotiations following adverse shocks, like COVID-19,
between signing and closing. An adverse shock between signing
and closing can reasonably be expected to reduce the valuation of
the seller in the eyes of the buyer. Whether any such decline is
sufficient to rise to the level that a court would declare the adverse
event a MAE/MAC is thought to be ambiguous. According to conventional wisdom, due to this judicial ambiguity buyers can credibly threaten to invoke the MAE/MAC clause to terminate the merger agreement and force a renegotiation that transfers transaction
surplus from the seller to the buyer, thus causing the seller to
share in at least a portion of the losses sustained by adverse shocks
prior to signing. The conventional wisdom, while not entirely incorrect, does, as we shall see, tend to overstate the case with respect to the utility of the MAE/MAC as a renegotiation clause.

23. CLAIRE HILL, BRIAN JM QUINN & STEVEN DAVIDOFF SOLOMON, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS: LAW, THEORY, AND PRACTICE 364 (2d ed. 2019) (noting the role MAE clauses
play in facilitating renegotiations); David J. Denis & Antonio J. Macias, Material Adverse
Change Clauses and Acquisition Dynamics, 48 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYSIS 819, 819 (2013)
(finding that MACs are responsible for 80% of renegotiations of merger agreements in their
sample); Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2089 (2009)
(“Because some level of disruption in the party’s business is highly foreseeable, and because
the actual disruption is not likely to MAC the business, a counterparty declaring a MAC on
the basis of materializing agreement risks is likely to be behaving opportunistically [by renegotiating the merger contract].”); Albert Choi & George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in
Contract Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848, 888–92 (2010) (arguing that vague MAE clauses are efficient partly because vague judicial standards facilitate renegotiation); Eric Talley, Drew O’Kane, Christian Kellner & Alexander Stremitzer,
The Measure of a MAC: A Machine-Learning Protocol for Analyzing Force Majeure Clauses
in M&A Agreements, 168 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 181, 183 (2012); Steven
M. Davidoff & Kristen Baiardi, Accredited Home Lenders v. Lone Star Funds: A MAC Case
Study 19 (Wayne State Univ. Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 0816, 2008), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1092115 [https://perma.cc/P
HM9-LQSJ] (reasoning that if a buyer credibly asserts a MAE, then both parties have incentives to renegotiate to a lower price to avoid an all-or-nothing litigation outcome).
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II. THE ROLE OF THE MAE/MAC IN MERGER AGREEMENTS
In contracts, “a deal’s a deal” is the rule.24 In contracts, parties
may at times seek to excuse performance of their obligations, relying on the doctrines of impracticability and frustration.25 To the
extent there are foreseeable risks, parties making unqualified
promises to perform necessarily assume an obligation to perform
even if the occurrence of a foreseeable adverse event makes performance impracticable. Absent contractual strategies to limit one’s
obligation to perform, courts will traditionally enforce parties’
agreements. These basic contractual doctrines are no less true in
the context of mergers and acquisitions, where parties are typically
represented by sophisticated counsel and negotiations are usually
meticulously fought.
The terms of merger agreements are highly negotiated. Rather
than rely on doctrines of excuse, like impracticability and frustration, parties to merger agreements have the ability to look forward
and envision a limited set of scenarios that might give rise to contractual rights to terminate the merger agreement pursuant to its
terms and thus avoid the expense and risk involved in litigating
excused performance. For example, merger agreements typically
include numerous conditions; failure of any condition at closing
will relieve the buyer from the obligation to complete the transaction. One such condition is a successful shareholder vote. In the
event shareholders do not vote to approve the transaction, the condition requiring a vote fails and the buyer is permitted to walk
away from the transaction without incurring a penalty. Other common conditions include government approval, required approvals
by other private third parties (e.g., landlords), and financing entities, to name a few.
The traditional role of a material adverse change clause in a
merger agreement has been functionally equivalent to that of a
force majeure clause, which acts to excuse performance in the
24. Waukesha Foundry v. Indus. Eng’g, 91 F.3d 1002, 1010 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Pacta sunt
servanda, or, ‘a deal’s a deal.’”).
25. The doctrine of impracticability excuses performance of a duty, where the said duty
has become unfeasibly difficult or expensive for the party who was to perform. See E. ALAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 624, 626 (4th ed. 2004). Frustration of purpose occurs when an
unforeseen event undermines a party’s principal purpose for entering into a contract such
that the performance of the contract is radically different from performance of the contract
that was originally contemplated by both parties. Id. at 634.
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event an adverse shock between signing and closing makes performance by the buyer impracticable or frustrates the buyer’s purpose.26 In that sense, the traditional MAE/MAC negotiated as part
of the merger agreement acts to excuse the buyer from performance.27 The role of the MAE/MAC clause has changed over time,
shifting it away from that of force majeure clauses to excuse buyer
performance in the event of adverse shocks to one that ensures
buyer performance in spite of adverse shocks.
In the context of a merger agreement, the material adverse effect
clause operates as a condition to closing, as a representation,
and/or to qualify a representation.28 The typical closing condition
states that a buyer need not close the transaction in the event there
has been a material adverse effect.29 In the alternative, the
MAE/MAC representation (the “back-door MAC”) forms the basis
for a termination right when read together with the “bringdown
condition.” The bringdown condition refreshes the seller’s representations as of the closing date. To the extent there has been a
material adverse change, the seller’s representation will not correct when the representations are brought down to the closing,
thus triggering a failure of the condition.30 In either event, a material adverse change between signing and closing permits the buyer
to decline to close the transaction for failure of a condition and then
terminate the transaction pursuant to its terms, walking away

26. See, e.g., Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, 619 F.2d 1001, 1015–16 (3d Cir.
1980).
27. I use the term “traditional MAE/MAC” in the manner used by Gilson and Schwartz
to describe a MAE/MAC without any carveouts. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7; see
also infra Part III (discussion of MAE/MAC structure).
28. A representation that there has not been a MAE/MAC is known as a “back-door
MAC.” See, e.g., James R. Griffin, 2009 M&A Deal Point Study: Strategic Buyer/Public Targets, M&A LAW., Nov./Dec. 2009, at 4.
29. See, e.g., Agreement and Plan of Merger Between Ferrari Group Holdings, L.P.,
Ferrari Merger Sub, Inc., and Forescout Technologies, Inc. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 7.2(d)
(Feb. 6, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1145057/000110465920012189/tm2
06949d3_ex2-1.htm [https://perma.cc/3GPY-BYLW] (“No Company Material Adverse Effect
will have occurred after the date of this Agreement that is continuing.”). In addition to the
bringdown condition, parties to complex contracts will also negotiate stand-alone termination provisions that permit one or both parties to terminate the pending contract pursuant
to its terms. The fiduciary termination right is a common termination provision, as is the
termination right triggered by what is known as the “drop dead date.”
30. Id. § 7.2(a)(ii) (“The representations and warranties . . . that are qualified by [a]
Company Material Adverse Effect . . . [are] true and correct in all respects . . . as of the
Closing Date as if made at and as of the Closing Date.”).
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without paying a termination fee or damages.31 In addition to the
bringdown condition, parties often negotiate a MAE as a separate
termination right. The MAE/MAC termination right functions
slightly differently from the bringdown condition. The bringdown
condition permits the buyer to decline to close once the seller
makes a determination that the seller has otherwise comported
with the conditions to closing. The MAE/MAC termination right,
on the other hand, permits the buyer to declare a MAE/MAC and
proactively terminate the merger agreement without necessarily
giving the seller the opportunity to cure the MAE/MAC or waiting
for the seller to close the transaction.
A. Structure of a Typical MAE Clause
The material adverse effect clause is made up of three basic components. In the first instance, the MAE/MAC places residual postsigning risks with the seller. The MAE/MAC is typically defined as
a circumstance that has or would reasonably be expected to have a
material adverse effect on the business or the financial condition
or results of operations of the target company.32 Of course, this definition of a MAE/MAC is almost impossibly vague. In general, however, the use of this traditional formulation of the MAE/MAC
makes it clear that if, during the interim between signing and closing, a material adverse shock occurs, then the seller bears the cost
of that adverse shock and not the buyer, who will not be required
to close.
Second, parties negotiate to trim back the buyer’s ability to walk
away from the deal by carving out from the definition of a material
adverse event certain foreseeable exogenous adverse events that
lie out of the control of both parties, like adverse changes in the
general economic conditions, financial markets, or regulatory, legislative or political conditions, among others.33 The effect of each of
these carveouts is to limit the application of the broad MAE/MAC
definition by excluding certain categories of foreseeable exogenous
31. Andrew A. Schwartz, A “Standard Clause Analysis” of the Frustration Doctrine and
the Material Adverse Change Clause, 57 UCLA L. REV. 789, 820 (2010) (“[T]he MAC clause
allows the acquirer to costlessly avoid closing the deal if the target’s business suffers a sufficiently adverse change during the executory period.”).
32. Kenneth A. Adams, A Legal-Usage Analysis of Material Adverse Change Provisions,
10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 9, 9, 17 (2004).
33. Id. at 43–44.
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adverse events. Although they might look like boilerplate, the
events carved out of the MAE/MAC definition are often highly negotiated. For example, it is common for parties to agree to carve
out from the MAE/MAC definition certain force majeure events,
like earthquakes, floods, wildfires or other natural disasters,
weather conditions, pandemics, and other force majeure events.34
Professor Miller breaks down the various carveouts into three separate categories: systematic risks (associated with general changes
in the economy, financial markets, and the industry of the target);
indicator risks (associated with the target’s financial performance,
including failure to meet financial projections and the estimates of
industry analysts); and finally agreement risks (associated with
adverse effects directly tied to execution of the merger agreement).35 To the extent a material adverse event occurs between
signing and closing and it falls under one of these exceptions, it
cannot form the basis for the buyer to terminate the merger agreement. The implication of the carveouts is to place the risk of certain
foreseeable exogenous events back on to the buyer, leaving the target holding only adverse risks endogenous to the target.
The third component of the MAE definition is the disproportionate-effect language that modifies all or some of the carveouts. Parties will often negotiate a carveout for a particular adverse exogenous event (e.g., an adverse change in financial markets), so if in
the event of a market collapse between signing and closing, that
collapse would not be considered a material adverse effect, unless
the target company suffered a disproportionately large loss relative to other firms in the same industry as a result of the collapse.36
The intent of the disproportionate-effect language is to claw back
at least some of the risk protection given the seller through the
broad carveouts for downturns in the economic climate, financial
markets, natural disasters, as well as pandemics like COVID-19.
To the extent a financial downturn or natural disaster adversely
affects the entire sector in which the target operates, it may nevertheless be a MAE if the target, for reasons endogenous to the
34. Force Majeure Clauses—Checklists and Sample Wording, WORLD BANK GROUP
PUB.-PRIV.-PARTNERSHIP LEGAL RESOURCE CTR., https://ppp.worldbank.org/public-privatepartnership/ppp-overview/practical-tools/checklists-and-risk-matrices/force-majeure-checklist [https://perma.cc/58A5-2JNS].
35. Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk Through MAC
Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007, 2073–89
(2009).
36. Adams, supra note 32, at 43–44; see also infra Appendix, Representative MAE.
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target, is more significantly affected than its industry competitors.
In this way, the carveouts play an important screening function.
Adverse shocks that have idiosyncratic effects on the target,
though the shocks are ostensibly exogenous, may reveal hidden information about the target. In that way, the disproportionate-effects language helps screen for semi-endogenous risks (exogenous
risks that have idiosyncratic effects on the target) and assigns
those risks to the seller rather than the buyer.
The structure of the modern MAE/MAC provision differs significantly from the traditional MAE/MAC. The addition of numerous
carveouts for systemic, indicator and agreement risks allocates the
risk of these adverse exogenous events between signing and closing
to the buyer, thus turning the traditional MAE/MAC on its head.
While the buyer holds the risk of exogenous events, the target
bears endogenous and semi-endogenous risks, which are all ostensibly within the control of the target.
B. Rationales for the MAE/MAC Provision
The so-called traditional MAE/MAC includes only the first component of this three-part formulation.37 In that form, the traditional MAE/MAC is a highly buyer-favorable provision that acts
effectively like a typical force majeure clause. Although more common in international commercial contracts, a typical force majeure
clause excuses performance in the event of an exogenous event that
could not be reasonably foreseen at the time of contracting, the effects of which cannot be reasonably mitigated by the party seeking
to avoid performance.38 Under the common law, contracting parties
can be excused from performance under the doctrine of impracticability or the related doctrine of frustration.39

37. Gilson & Schwartz term the MAE without any carve outs a “traditional” MAE. See
Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 331–37.
38. INT’L CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, FORCE MAJEURE AND HARDSHIP CLAUSES (Mar.
2020), https://iccwbo.org/content/uploads/sites/3/2020/03/icc-forcemajeure-hardship-clauses
-march2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/SH2P-4K6W]; UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES art. 7.1.7 (Force
Majeure), https://www.unidroit.org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles2010/404-chapter-7-non-performance-section-1-non-performance-in-general/1050-article-71-7-force-majeure [https://perma.cc/AB7U-B7UD].
39. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 789 (arguing that MAE/MAC clauses implicate the traditional contract doctrine of frustration).
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Like its cousin force majeure, impracticability requires the occurrence of an event that attacks the basic assumption of the contract. As with force majeure, there must be an occurrence of a condition, the nonoccurrence of which was a basic assumption of the
contract, that makes performance extremely expensive or difficult
to complete; further, the impracticability must have resulted without the fault of the party seeking to be excused.40 For a court to
determine that a party may excuse performance under the doctrine
of frustration, that party must first show that the adverse event
“substantially frustrated” the party’s “principal purpose”; second,
the party must show that the purpose was a “basic assumption” of
the contract; third, frustration must have resulted without fault of
the party seeking to be excused; and finally, the party seeking to
be excused must not assume a greater obligation than the law imposes.41 Professor Schwartz observes that although frustration and
impracticability are extremely high bars for contract performance,
parties can, and do, negotiate frustration clauses that lower the
bar for relief by relying on materiality qualifiers.42
Like a force majeure clause, a negotiated frustration clause may
also include a list of specific adverse events, the occurrence of
which will presumptively result in an excusal from performance.
Unlike a force majeure clause, such events more typically involve
the economic atmosphere that gives incentive to the transaction,
like “severe reduction in demand” or “radically changed market
conditions.”43 Central to the understanding of the traditional
MAE/MAC as a force majeure/frustration clause is that the occurrence of an exogenous material adverse event gives rise to a right
by the buyer to terminate the transaction and walk away. To the
extent the adverse event lies within the control of the buyer, the
buyer may not rely on the clause to terminate the transaction.44
In their influential paper on MAE/MAC clauses, Professors Gilson and Schwartz explain the role of the MAE/MAC in merger
40. 2 E. ALLEN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 9.6 (2d ed. 1998);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
41. 2 FARNSWORTH, supra note 40, § 9.7; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 265
(AM. LAW INST. 1981).
42. Schwartz, supra note 31, at 806–07.
43. Id. at 810.
44. See id. at 812 (“A ‘reduction in demand,’ for instance, might be due to changing
tastes of fickle consumers (an exogenous cause) or a poorly executed advertising campaign
(an endogenous cause).”).
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agreements, as well as the expansion in the use of exceptions to the
MAE/MAC clause in recent years.45 Gilson and Schwartz advance
two possible explanations for the extensive use of MAE/MACs in
merger agreements. First is the symmetry hypothesis. Under the
symmetry hypothesis, the traditional MAE/MAC exists to provide
symmetry for buyers against an effective judicial out that sellers
have.46 Development of the takeover jurisprudence starting in the
mid-1980s gave rise to the judicial obligations of sellers to include
fiduciary termination rights in merger agreements.47 The traditional MAE/MAC steps into the breach and provides buyers a
roughly symmetrical equivalent to the seller’s fiduciary termination right—if between signing and closing circumstances dramatically change to reduce the value of the target, the buyer is permitted to terminate the transaction.48 In that sense, the MAE/MAC
plays the role of the force majeure/frustration clause as predicted
by Professors Gilson and Schwartz. However, Gilson and Schwartz
find a lack of empirical support for this position.49
The second hypothesis Professors Gilson and Schwartz put forward is the investment hypothesis.50 Because the traditional
MAE/MAC imposes exogenous risks on the target, the investment
hypothesis holds that buyers and sellers agree to include carveouts
to the MAE/MAC definition to reduce the degree of ambiguity associated with the MAE/MAC provision. This creates incentives for
the target to continue to make corporate investments necessary between signing and closing (i.e., to overcome moral hazard inherent
in the last-period problem).51 A secondary result of the investment
hypothesis is to flip the assignment of exogenous risks from the
seller to the buyer and to, in effect, curtail the ability of the
MAE/MAC to act as a force majeure/frustration clause. On the
other hand, assigning exogenous risks to the buyer is more efficient

45. See Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 330.
46. Id. at 336.
47. Id. at 335.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 345.
50. Id. at 349.
51. Id. at 345; see Sean J. Griffith, Deal Protection Provisions in the Last Period of Play,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899, 1947–1953 (2003) (discussing the last-period problem in merger
transactions).
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because the costs of an exogenous risk, which will only really materialize after the closing of the transaction, are borne by the buyer
and not the seller.52
At the time of Gilson and Schwartz’s article in 2005, contracting
practices typically limited the use of carveouts to deals involving
technology sector targets. Gilson and Schwartz observed an increasing tendency in the high technology sector to expand the list
of carveouts, the effect of which is to shift the risk of undiversifiable, exogenous adverse events from the target to the buyer in technology transactions.53 Gilson and Schwartz argued that such an
observation was consistent with their investment hypothesis. They
predicted that carveouts would become common in transactions requiring important post-signing seller investments to maintain the
value of the target going forward, like technology businesses and
businesses dependent on critical human resources.54
Although the symmetry theory is attractive, Gilson and
Schwartz found that it lacks empirical support.55 The symmetry
theory suggests reliance on a traditional MAE/MAC where the
costs of exogenous risks are borne by the seller. However, the increasing reliance on carveouts in business sectors susceptible to
post-signing moral hazard suggests that the option value of symmetrical walk rights is low relative to other potential explanations
for the use of MAE/MAC provisions. Gilson and Schwartz conclude
that by shifting the cost of exogenous risks to the buyer through
the use of carveouts and leaving the costs of endogenous risks with
the seller, the merger contract better mitigates post-signing moral
hazard and more efficiently allocates risks to the parties best positioned to absorb them.56
While Gilson and Schwartz theorize the motivations for
MAE/MAC clauses and the carveouts, Professors Choi and Triantis
add to Gilson and Schwartz’s analysis by introducing the effect of
vagueness of the MAE/MAC contract term on bargaining dynamics.57 Although commentators have urged on practitioners the

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 346–47.
Id. at 332–33.
See id. at 340.
Id. at 349.
See id. at 345.
See Choi & Triantis, supra note 23, at 854.
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adoption of numerical triggers to MAE/MAC conditions, dealmakers have steadfastly resisted such entreaties. They instead rely on
more vague descriptions of material adverse events for purposes of
the MAE/MAC clause, leaving definition of a MAE/MAC to the
courts.58
Choi and Triantis observe that rather than mistakes, decisions
by drafters to avoid specificity with respect to the MAE/MAC definition are strategic choices.59 They argue that vagueness in the
MAE/MAC definition generates incentives that help the parties
overcome the problems of asymmetric information in the contracting.60 The role of carveouts in the MAE/MAC definition, they argue,
is to reduce noise and sharpen the effectiveness of the MAE/MAC
as a signal for private information.61 In addition, vagueness associated with the MAE/MAC provision facilitates efficient renegotiation of merger agreements following adverse shocks that have the
effect of reducing the buyer’s valuation of the target.62 Vagueness
results in enforcement costs associated with litigating the merger
agreement. Because sellers must bear the costs of enforcement, the
litigation costs associated with enforcing a MAE/MAC provision
can act as a screen to extract additional private information from
the seller and promote efficient renegotiations.63 Only where the
seller believes there to be a credible threat with respect to judicial
enforcement of the merger contract will it pursue litigation and enforcement. Where the seller’s litigation threat is not credible, because the seller has reason to know, given its private information,
that adverse shock exceeds the judicial threshold for a MAE/MAC,
sellers will have an incentive to pursue renegotiation.64 Such renegotiations may be efficient because only “good” sellers who have
private information and know their likelihood of success on their
MAE/MAC claim is high will pursue costly litigation, while sellers
who have private information that suggests their MAE/MAC claim
will fail will not have an incentive to pursue such litigation.65 With
private seller information about the nature of the adverse shock
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

See id. at 880–81.
Id. at 855.
Id. at 859.
Id. at 867.
See id. at 891–92.
Id.
Id. at 891.
See id. at 894–95.
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with respect to the seller so revealed, buyers and sellers can successfully renegotiate, efficiently shift costs associated with the adverse shock to the seller, and move to closing.66
The challenge with a critique that MAE/MAC provisions are too
vague is that it suggests there is a normal distribution of judicial
outcomes around the mean definition of a MAE. It further assumes
courts will almost randomly determine that some events rise to the
level of a MAE/MAC and others do not, and that buyers and sellers
cannot reliably predict how a court might rule when asked to determine the meaning of the provisions. This seemingly random distribution of judicial outcomes gives rise to ambiguity with respect
to determining whether any specific adverse shock will potentially
receive a judicial determination of a MAE/MAC. However, with respect to MAE/MAC provisions, courts in Delaware have only ever
once permitted a buyer to walk away from a merger agreement due
to a MAE/MAC.67 This suggests that rather than being strategically vague, there is a high degree of predictability with respect to
how courts will find on legal challenges seeking to enforce claimed
MAE/MACs. As a consequence, when sellers agree to negotiate in
response to a buyer’s refusal to close, they are not necessarily revealing private information about the nature of the adverse shock,
but are rather exhibiting risk aversion (i.e., overestimating their
own litigation risk).
III. WHAT DO COURTS SAY ABOUT MAE/MAC CLAUSES?
Typically, in contract, when parties reach an agreement on a
bargain, courts will enforce the agreement. The fact that circumstances may have changed between signing and closing does not
generate a per se right for parties to walk away from their obligations under the terms of the agreement. Courts have developed a
number of doctrines of excuse (e.g., the doctrines of frustration, impracticability, and force majeure) that will excuse contractual performance.68 Rather than rely on these doctrines of excuse, in the
66. Id. at 896.
67. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS
325 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (finding a MAE and permitting buyer to terminate a merger
agreement).
68. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Essex Grp., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 53, 70–71 (W.D. Pa.
1980) (“The doctrine of mistake of fact requires that the mistake relate to a basic assumption
on which the contract was made. The doctrine of impracticability requires that the non-
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context of merger agreements, parties lean on MAE/MAC provisions to contract around the obligations to close in situations where
impracticability or frustration might otherwise arise. That said,
courts are hesitant to reach the conclusion that a MAE/MAC has
occurred that will allow buyers to walk away from a merger agreement.69 Prior to the 2010s, that hesitance might well have be attributed to the inherent vagueness of the material adverse effect
clause itself. However, recent cases make it clear that courts and
dealmakers have internalized the prevailing academic view of the
MAE/MAC, and that the court’s hesitance to enforce is due not to
vagueness of the contracted term, but to the changed nature of the
provision’s purpose.
The earlier view of the MAE/MAC as a broad force majeure/frustration clause has, over time, given way in the context of merger
contracting to a contrary provision that, in effect, reads out common law performance excuses and turns the MAE/MAC into a riskshifting provision that places the burden of adverse exogenous
events—including force majeure events—on the buyer and not the
seller. Of the MAE/MAC cases, there are three that are important
for understanding the development of the Delaware courts’ doctrine in this area: In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,70 Hexion
Specialty Chemicals, Inc. v. Huntsman Corp.,71 and Akorn v. Fresenius.72 In IBP, the court was asked to apply a traditional
MAE/MAC. Later, in Hexion and Akorn, following developments in
contracting practice, the thinking of courts evolved to reflect the
current merger contracting practices with respect to modern
MAE/MAC provisions.

occurrence of the ‘event’, . . . or the non-existence of the ‘fact’, . . . causing the impracticability
be a basic assumption on which the contract is made.” (citations omitted)).
69. Timothy Harkness, Kate Apostolova & Nathan Hembree, Do I Have to Go Through
With This? A Summary of Recently Filed MAE/MAC Cases, FRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS
DERINGER L. BLOG (Apr. 19, 2020), https://blog.freshfields.us/post/102g53q/do-i-have-to-gothrough-with-this-a-summary-of-recently-filed-mae-mac-cases [https://perma.cc/25FG-9J
5S] (“[T]ransaction terminations based on the occurrence of an MAE/MAC are rare, and the
standard by which Delaware courts judge whether an MAE/MAC has occurred is incredibly
high.”).
70. 789 A.2d 14, 52 (Del. Ch. 2001). Although IBP involved a Delaware court interpreting New York law, its reasoning was later adopted in toto by the Delaware Chancery Court
in Frontier Oil. Frontier Oil Corp. v. Holly Corp., C.A. No. 20502, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57,
at *127–28 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 2005).
71. 965 A.2d 715, 738 (2008).
72. Akorn, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS 325.
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A. IBP Shareholders Litigation
In re IBP, Inc. Shareholders Litigation is perhaps the best
known, and most important, of the MAE/MAC cases.73 Although
IBP was decided by a Delaware court interpreting New York law,
it is nevertheless the seminal case for thinking about the
MAE/MAC.74 In IBP, Tyson Foods, the nation’s leading chicken distributor, sought to walk away from an agreement to acquire IBP,
the number-one beef and number-two pork distributor in the country, following a vigorous auction.75 Tyson’s decision to attempt to
terminate the merger agreement was preceded by a severe winter,
which adversely affected the performance of both Tyson and IBP
equally, as well as the disclosure of financial irregularities at an
IBP subsidiary.76 Tyson pointed to both of these and sought to exercise its right to avoid performance due to there being a material
adverse effect.77
The MAE clause in IBP was a traditional MAC in that it contained only the first of the three components of the now-typical
MAE formulation.78 There was no language carving out exceptions
to the definition or disproportionate effect on the seller.79 The central question for the court in IBP involved an interpretation of the
definition of the traditional MAE/MAC that gave rise to Tyson’s
purported right to avoid performance. The traditional MAE/MAC
relied on by the parties in IBP was drafted with purposefully broad
and vague language.80 IBP’s traditional MAE/MAC played the role
of a force majeure/frustration clause. Such clauses are broadly
drafted but typically provide for a termination right in the event of
a specified adverse event (e.g., war, rebellion, earthquakes,

73. 789 A.2d at 52.
74. Although IBP is not precedent, the reasoning in IBP was later adopted in Frontier
Oil. See Frontier Oil Corp., 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 57, at *128.
75. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 21.
76. Id. at 22, 27–28.
77. Id. at 51–52.
78. See supra section II.A.
79. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 65–66.
80. Id. at 65 (“Under the contract, a material adverse effect (or ‘MAE’) is defined as ‘any
event, occurrence or development of a state of circumstances or facts which has had or reasonably could be expected to have a Material Adverse Effect’ . . . ‘on the condition (financial
or otherwise), business, assets, liabilities or results of operations of [IBP] and [its] Subsidiaries taken as whole. . . .’”).
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drought, flood, etc.) during the pre-closing period.81 IBP’s MAE/
MAC definition mirrored such a clause but without the enumerated list of adverse events.
In evaluating the buyer’s claims, the court read the role of the
traditional MAE/MAC as that of a force majeure/frustration clause
and laid out a three-pronged approach to interpreting these provisions:
[E]ven where a Material Adverse Effect condition is as broadly written
as the one in the Merger Agreement, that provision is best read as a
backstop protecting the acquiror from [1] the occurrence of unknown
events that [2] substantially threaten the overall earnings potential
of the target in [3] a durationally-significant manner. A short-term
hiccup in earnings would not suffice; rather the Material Adverse Effect should be material when viewed from the longer-term perspective
of a reasonable acquiror.82

It is left to the finder of fact to determine whether the adverse
event in question rises to the level of a MAE/MAC so as to trigger
the buyer’s right to walk. The key for the court’s understanding
whether an adverse event is material for purposes of the
MAE/MAC must be “viewed from the longer-term perspective of
the reasonable acquirer.”83 The buyer, after all, buys the company
for the long term and is not necessarily dissuaded by short term
blips in performance or ambient economic conditions that it will
have to endure in any event beginning immediately following closing of the transaction.84
Of course, Delaware courts typically eschew bright-line rules
and view this kind of ambiguity as a net positive for the application
of the corporate law.85 In IBP, Vice Chancellor Strine noted that a
“broadly written” MAE provision “is best read as a backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown events. . . .”86
Broadly drafted provisions grant a high degree of discretion to the
81. See, e.g., Force Majeure Clauses—Checklists and Sample Wording, supra note 34;
Practical Guidance, Commercial Clause Description—Miscellaneous: Force Majeure,
BLOOMBERG L. (2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/corporate/document/XD6TO
5TS000000 [https://perma.cc/AY5Y-6TWS].
82. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 67 (“It is odd to think that a strategic buyer would view a short-term blip in
earnings as material, so long as the target’s earnings-generating potential is not materially
affected by that blip or the blip’s cause.”).
85. William T. Allen, Ambiguity in Corporation Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894 (1997).
86. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68.
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finder of fact and may improve efficiency in contract drafting as
parties will inevitably find the ex ante cost of specifying all material risks to the contract prohibitively expensive.87 In that sense,
the MAE/MAC provision acts as a force majeure clause. In a footnote, Vice Chancellor Strine remarked that the court’s approach to
interpreting traditional MAE/MAE clauses “as addressing fundamental events that would materially affect the value of a target to
a reasonable acquiror eliminates the need for drafting [extremely
detailed MAC clauses with numerous carveouts or qualifiers]” akin
to the way drafters typically draft force majeure provisions, which
will include specific lists of “act of God” events that will presumptively result in a termination right by the buyer.88
Because this definition of a MAE/MAC is forward-looking, it is,
as Choi and Triantis observe, necessarily vague. As the well-known
American philosopher Yogi Berra once said, “‘It’s tough to make
predictions, especially about the future.’”89 Adverse events that occur during the eight-to-twelve-week pre-closing period rarely announce themselves as durationally significant.90 Indeed, it is normally impossible for an informed observer to accurately predict
whether an adverse event will be sufficiently long-lasting as to affect the long-term earnings potential of the target and thus trigger
the MAE/MAC condition.91 Consequently, the traditional
MAE/MAC formulation is sufficiently vague as to be an invitation
to litigation in the manner predicted by Choi and Triantis.
B. Huntsman v. Hexion
The global financial crisis of 2008, like the COVID-19 outbreak,
represented a rapid and dramatic shift in economic performance

87. OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 43–68 (1996).
88. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 68 n.155.
89. The Perils of Prediction, ECONOMIST (May 31, 2007), https://www.economist.com/
books-and-arts/2007/05/31/the-perils-of-prediction [https://perma.cc/Z6WY-8ME7] (attributing the quote to Yogi Berra).
90. Cf. In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 67 (discussing how a short-term hiccup would not
amount to an adverse event, and a durationally significant adverse event usually spans
years, not mere months).
91. Cf. Robert Malionek & Jon Weichselbaum, Five Keys to Analyzing a Material Adverse Effect, N.Y. L.J. (Mar. 6, 2019), https://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/five-keys-ana
lyzing-material-adverse-effect-ny-law-journal [https://perma.cc/XG5K-N7SL] (explaining
how it is difficult to determine whether an event is materially adverse, and in particular,
the difficulty in determining whether an event is durationally significant).
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across the entire economy. As lending markets froze, the prospects
for private-equity-sponsored deals dimmed. Illiquid credit markets
were especially difficult for pending transactions. Buyers entered
into transactions thinking that they would be able to rely on the
financial markets to provide the necessary financing but then were
left unable to complete transactions when these markets froze.92
Hexion was one such case where the sudden illiquidity of lending
markets caused the buyer to engage in second thoughts about the
wisdom of the proposed acquisition.93
Following a competitive bidding process for Huntsman Corp. in
July 2007, Hexion agreed to “pay a substantially higher price than
the competition and to commit to stringent deal terms, including
no ‘financing out.’”94 Consequently, the buyer took on the risk of
being able to secure financing to make the deal happen. However,
following difficulties in the financial markets in June 2008, Hexion
sought to walk away from the transaction by filing suit, making
two arguments. 95 First, that financing in the amount necessary to
complete the transaction was no longer available in the market;
and second, even if Hexion were able to secure financing to complete the transaction as proposed, the combined entity would be
immediately insolvent.96 The buyer sought a declaratory order
from the court that Huntsman had suffered an MAE/MAC under
the terms of the merger agreement and that the buyer would no
longer be required to close the transaction.97
By the time of the Hexion litigation, market practice and the understanding of the courts with respect to the role of the MAE had
already changed. IBP market practice limited the use of
MAE/MAC carveouts to deals in the technology sector. However,
by the time of Hexion, some eight years later, carveouts to the
MAE/MAC definition had become much more common.98 Unlike

92. See, e.g., Hexion Specialty Chems., Inc. v. Hunstman Corp., 965 A.2d 715, 720–21,
731 (Del. Ch. 2008) (discussing a situation where the buyer wanted to back out of a merger
after an illiquid and frozen credit market caused the buyer to lack sufficient funds to close
the transaction).
93. See id.
94. Id. at 721.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 722.
98. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 330, 340, 350, 354–55 (observing that carveouts
to the MAE/MAC definition are typically limited to the buyers and sellers in the technology
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IBP, where the parties agreed to a traditional MAE/MAC, in Hexion the parties negotiated a “narrowly tailored” MAE/MAC definition.99 The MAE/MAC agreed to in the Hexion transaction included
a number of carveouts subject to disproportionate-effects language
(semi-endogenous risks). The carveout that was most directly relevant to the litigation was the disproportionate-effect analysis of the
carveout that excluded changes in general economic or financial
market conditions as well as any changes in the chemical industry
generally.100
In considering Hexion’s claim, Vice Chancellor Lamb did three
things. First, the court reiterated, as in IBP, that the question of
whether or not an adverse event is an MAE/MAC must be evaluated against an assumption that the buyer is buying the target as
part of a long-term strategy measured in years, not months.101 The
burden of demonstrating the long-term adverse effect sits with the
buyer who is seeking to escape performance of the merger contract.102 Second, the court made it clear that in order to evaluate
sector); see Michael J. Halloran & D. Stanley Rowland, Changes in Material Adverse Change
Provisions in High Tech Deals, M&A LAW., Mar. 1999 (“More exceptions are being grafted
onto [MAC] provisions because of the high volatility experienced in stock trading prices and
in economic and market conditions . . . .”).
99. Hexion, 965 A.2d at 724.
100. Agreement and Plan of Merger Among Hexion Specialty Chemicals, Inc., Nimbus
Merger Sub Inc., and Huntsman Corporation (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1), § 3.1(a)(ii) (July 12,
2007), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1307954/000110465907053855/a07-18690_
3ex2d1.htm [https://perma.cc//CK9G-X7WJ] (defining the “Company Material Adverse Effect” as “any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect that is materially adverse to the
financial condition, business, or results of operations of the Company and its Subsidiaries,
taken as a whole; provided, however, that in no event shall any of the following constitute a
Company Material Adverse Effect: (A) any occurrence, condition, change, event or effect
resulting from or relating to changes in general economic or financial market conditions,
except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, change, event
or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a
whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry; (B) any occurrence,
condition, change, event or effect that affects the chemical industry generally (including
changes in commodity prices, general market prices and regulatory changes affecting the
chemical industry generally) except in the event, and only to the extent, that such occurrence, condition, change, event or effect has had a disproportionate effect on the Company
and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as compared to other Persons engaged in the chemical industry, (C) the outbreak or escalation of hostilities involving the United States, the
declaration by the United States of war or the occurrence of any natural disasters and acts
of terrorism, except in the event, and only to the extent, of any damage or destruction to or
loss of the Company’s or its Subsidiaries’ physical properties . . . .”).
101. Hexion, 965 A.2d at 738.
102. Id. (“This, of course, is not to say that evidence of a significant decline in earnings
by the target corporation during the period after signing but prior to the time appointed for
closing is irrelevant. Rather, it means that for such a decline to constitute a material adverse
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the MAE/MAC carveouts, the court must first determine that there
had been a MAE/MAC under the traditional MAE/MAC definition.103 Third, the court must then analyze whether the adverse
shock has disproportionately affected the target company relative
to the industry in which the target operated in order to determine
whether the adverse shock was semi-endogenous and therefore not
subject to the negotiated carveouts.104 Although Huntsman was not
performing as well as others in the same industry following the
onset of the global financial crisis of 2008, the court determined
that the financial crisis did not reach the level of a traditional
MAE/MAC as defined, and thus the MAE/MAC was not triggered.105
Rather than play the role of a force majeure clause as described
in IBP, in Hexion the court explicitly recognized the new risk-allocation role of modern MAE/MAC clauses, assigning exogenous
risks to the buyer and endogenous and semi-endogenous risks to
the target.
C. Akorn v. Fresenius
Akorn represents a watershed moment with respect to
MAE/MAC clauses.106 Akorn represents the first, and only, case
where a court has found there to be an adverse event sufficient to
meet the definition of a MAE/MAC to permit a buyer to walk away
from the transaction.107 In Akorn, the court held, among other
things, that (1) target company Akorn’s sudden and sustained drop
in business performance constituted an MAE; and (2) Akorn’s representations regarding regulatory compliance were not true and
effect, poor earnings results must be expected to persist significantly into the future.”).
103. Id. at 739–40.
104. Id. at 737 (“The plain meaning of the carve-outs found in the proviso is to prevent
certain occurrences which would otherwise be MAE’s being found to be so. If a catastrophe
were to befall the chemical industry and cause a material adverse effect in Huntsman’s
business, the carve-outs would prevent this from qualifying as an MAE under the Agreement. But the converse is not true—Huntsman’s performance being disproportionately
worse than the chemical industry in general does not, in itself, constitute an MAE. Thus,
unless the court concludes that the company has suffered an MAE as defined in the language coming before the proviso, the court need not consider the application of the chemical
industry carve-outs.”).
105. Id. at 721, 743.
106. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS
325 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018).
107. See id.
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correct, and that this deviation would reasonably be expected to
result in an MAE.108
In Akorn, not long after the parties signed the merger agreement, the buyer started to receive anonymous whistleblower accounts from an employee of Akorn alerting it to ongoing fraud involving Akorn’s director of quality assurance.109 The allegations
were that the director was embezzling from the company by submitting expenses for quality tests that were never undertaken.110
Worse, statements that the company had undertaken these phantom quality assurance tests were submitted to the FDA as part of
the approval process for Akorn’s candidate drugs.111 Submission of
false data to the FDA obviously called into question the entire approval process for all the affected drug candidates.112 In response
to the whistleblower allegations, Akorn approached the FDA and
“downplayed its problems and oversold its remedial efforts” in a
misleading presentation to the agency.113 In addition, a few days
after the parties signed the merger agreement, Akorn’s business
“dropped off a cliff,” leading to an initial decline in revenues of
more than 25% followed by continued declines in business performance due to loss of an important contract as well as unexpected
new competition.114 The court observed that Akorn’s year-overyear quarterly decline in revenue, operating income, and EPS had
all deteriorated significantly during the pre-closing period.
YEAR-OVER-YEAR CHANGE IN AKORN’S PERFORMANCE115
Q2 2017

Q3 2017

Q4 2017

FY 2017

Q1 2018

Revenue

(29%)

(29%)

(34%)

(25%)

(27%)

Operating Income

(84%)

(89%)

(292%)

(105%)

(134%)

EPS

(96%)

(105%)

(300%)

(113%)

(170%)

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at *109–10.
Id. at *62.
Id. at *63–64.
Id.
Id. at *151–53.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *126–28, *242 tbl.4.
Id. at *242 tbl.4.
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After a trial, the Chancery Court found that the causes of
Akorn’s declining performance were material and durationally significant as the decline had already persisted for at least a year and
showed no signs of abating.116 Although Akorn pointed to industry
headwinds as the reasons for its poor performance, the company
vastly underperformed compared to any of its competitors in the
industry.117 The court found that even if the material adverse effect
was subject to a carveout, it was semi-endogenous and thus not
carved out from the MAE definition. The disproportionate impact
of any economic headwinds on Akorn suggested that the problems
exemplified by the downturn were specific to the company.118
The court also identified a MAE/MAC stemming from Akorn’s
problems with regulatory compliance.119 The parties had agreed to
a representation in the merger agreement that Akorn had been in
compliance with all applicable law, including regulatory compliance, subject to a MAE qualifier.120 To the extent any compliance
failure resulted in a MAE, the representation would fail to be true
and accurate at closing, and generate a separate right by the buyer
to walk away.121 In fact, at trial Fresenius established that Akorn’s
regulatory difficulties were of such qualitative and quantitative
significance—causing the FDA to review each and every affected
drug candidate—that the effect on Akorn’s business was material
and durationally significant when viewed from the long-term perspective of a reasonable acquirer, thus creating a second basis upon
which the buyer could walk away from the transaction.122

116. Id. at *126–27.
117. Id. at *133, *136 n.616.
118. Id. at *134–37.
119. Id. at *109–10.
120. See id. at *43–45.
121. See id. at *183–84, *183 n.761.
122. Id. at *193. In a subsequent case, Channel Medsystems v. Boston Scientific, the parties were faced—oddly enough—with a similar set of facts. Improprieties with the quality
assurance program at Channel Medsystems led them to submit false reports to the FDA.
Citing Akorn, Boston Scientific sought to terminate the merger agreement. However, the
structure of the Channel Medsystems agreement was different. The agreement was structured as an option. In the event Channel Medsystems received approval for its candidate
drugs by March 2019, then Boston Scientific would be required to complete the purchase.
In effect, the court was not required to make a ruling on whether the identified improprieties
rose to the level of a MAE. If the seller could cure the improprieties with the FDA prior to
the March trigger, then, by definition, the improprieties would not be material adverse
events and the buyer would be required to close on the transaction. If, on the other hand,
the improprieties caused the FDA to balk on approval and the March trigger was missed,

QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

592

2/10/2021 10:08 PM

UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:565

Although in many areas of the common law an accumulation of
a large number of cases with various factual scenarios is required
to distill the view of the court, the opposite has been true with respect to the development of the MAE/MAC jurisprudence. Although the MAE/MAC may appear vague, courts, with a single exception, have uniformly ruled that the factual scenarios typically
presented by buyers do not represent a MAE/MAC sufficient to
trigger a walk right. Absent adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous events during the executory period, the modern MAE/MAC
locks buyers into completing transactions. Adverse exogenous
shocks are a risk that the buyer must absorb while adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous shocks are risks best left with the
seller. There are sound economic reasons for turning the traditional MAE/MAC on its head and allocating the risks with the parties best able to bear or ameliorate them. Courts, for their part,
have quickly adopted these rationales.
IV. RENEGOTIATIONS IN THE COVID-19 ERA
Against the backdrop of how courts evaluate MAE/MAC claims
and how parties to merger agreements are using modern
MAE/MACs, one can ask whether the conventional wisdom that
buyers will use the MAE/MAC clauses as a lever to force a renegotiation in the event of an adverse event has any purchase. Recent
experience with the COVID-19 outbreak suggests that the conventional wisdom gets this wrong. The Forescout renegotiation seems
to be the exception to the rule; though it may not be at second
glance. Given the relative paucity of renegotiations and court actions, parties to the merger agreements appear to understand that
the modern MAE/MAC does not function in response to situations
like the COVID-19 outbreak as a force majeure clause to facilitating renegotiations. Rather, it appears that market participants
have internalized and operationalized the view that the modern
MAE/MAC acts to apportion risk between buyer and seller, with
risk of adverse exogenous events borne by the buyer and the risk
of adverse endogenous events borne by the seller. In that sense, the

then the buyer would be under no obligation to complete the purchase. In any event, the
seller was able to cure, and the court found that there had not been a MAE. See Channel
Medsystems, Inc. v. Boston Sci. Corp., C.A. No. 2018-0673-AGB, 2019 Del. Ch. LEXIS 1394,
at *12, *16, *32, *39–40, *71, *73 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2019).
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worldwide COVID-19 outbreak is an archetypal exogenous adverse
shock, the cost of which must be borne by the buyer.
Of course, it is entirely true that in the wake of the COVID-19
outbreak targets in pending transactions may well be considerably
less valuable to buyers over the long term than they were prior to
COVID-19. It is also likely true that buyers may wish to renegotiate the terms of their pending merger agreements or even cancel
them altogether. However, doing so would require the seller—who
will have no control over the operation of the business into the future—rather than the buyer to bear the cost of a durationally significant, exogenous event. At the same time, the modern
MAE/MAC does not provide a credible lever for buyers to push the
cost of a worldwide pandemic onto the shoulders of sellers rather
than to leave those costs where they had been agreed to rest, on
the shoulders of buyers.
The recent experience of LVMH–Tiffany presents a salient example. The original merger agreement was agreed to on November
24, 2019, in advance of the pandemic.123 The agreement included a
modern MAE/MAC with extensive carveouts and disproportionateeffect language covering semi-endogenous risks. The agreement
did not, however, include a specific carveout for pandemics.124 Following the COVID-19 outbreak, the luxury retail business is facing
what can only be described as adverse shock. Although LVMH considered whether to declare a MAE/MAC under the terms of the
agreement and either terminate or renegotiate the price, it declined to do either. Rather, in September 2020, LVMH announced
that it would permit the deal to hit the outside date and expire on
November 24, 2020, following a request by French authorities to
delay the closing of the deal until after January 6, 2021.125 Following a declaratory action brought against it by the seller, LVMH
123. Agreement and Plan of Merger By and Among Tiffany & Co., LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, Breakfast Holdings Acquisition Corp., and Breakfast Acquisition
Corp. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Nov. 24, 2019) [hereinafter LVMH–Tiffany Merger Agreement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000119312519299997/d840067dex2
1.htm [https://perma.cc/YU36-VFWQ].
124. The “acts of God” carveout, which would typically include the pandemic carveout,
included only carveouts for “hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake or other natural disaster.” Id. § 1.1. Arguably, a pandemic might fall under the general rubric of a natural disaster.
125. Andrea Felsted, LVMH Finds a Convenient Excuse to Dump Tiffany, BLOOMBERG
(Sept. 9, 2020, 8:05 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-09-09/lvmh-find
s-a-convenient-excuse-to-dump-tiffany [https://perma.cc/D9A3-E9V8].
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filed a countersuit in which it argued that there had been a
MAE/MAC despite initially declining to declare a MAE/MAC and
attempting to walk away.126
LVMH’s argument was three-fold. First, it argued that COVID19 was a material adverse event that had not been carved out from
the agreement.127 LVMH argued that Tiffany could have sought a
specific carveout against the occurrence of a pandemic but did
not.128 Therefore, Tiffany should bear the cost of the subsequent
occurrence of this unforeseeable exogenous event. Of course, to the
extent courts believe the economic rationale for modern MAE/MAC
clauses, this reasoning is unsatisfying. There is no particular reason to believe that Tiffany’s, rather than the buyer, is in a better
position to ameliorate the ongoing effects of a global pandemic. To
rule for LVMH would merely reward the buyer for its good fortune
that the exogenous adverse shock happened not to be on its enumerated list of carveouts. LVMH’s second argument, one with perhaps more purchase, was that even if the COVID-19 pandemic is
covered as an act of God, it was a semi-endogenous risk, the cost of
which should properly be allocated to Tiffany and not LVMH.129 As
evidence, LVMH pointed to the poor performance of shopping malls
and tourist destinations, which LVMH argued were responsible for
a significant portion of Tiffany’s sales.130
LVMH’s final argument was not related to the MAE/MAC at all.
LVMH argued that when Tiffany’s shut its retail operations in response to the government-mandated shutdowns across the country, it nevertheless continued to pay its regular dividend rather
than conserve cash. LVMH’s argument was, in effect, that in response to the COVID-19 outbreak the “ordinary course” covenant
required Tiffany’s to conserve cash rather than to continue to pay
it in the form of dividends.131
Ultimately, the parties renegotiated the terms of the merger
agreement rather than proceeding to litigation. However, the
terms of the renegotiation suggest it was more of a fig leaf than a
126.
at 1–2.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

LVMH’s Verified Counterclaim and Answer to Verified Complaint, supra note 10,
Id. at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 9.
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substantive reapportionment of the costs of the pandemic. First
and foremost, the parties agreed to reduce the price term from
$135/share to $131.50/share, a 2.6% reduction.132 It is hard to argue that a 2.6% reduction in value represents a material redistribution of the risk associated with the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak.
This price reduction was not costless to the buyer, however. In exchange for a price reduction, the seller received a number of valuable changes to the terms of original agreement. These included a
specific agreement to permit Tiffany’s to make dividend payments
to its shareholders, as well as an agreement that, in the event Tiffany’s must go to court to seek performance of the merger agreement again, the merger consideration for purposes of determining
damages would revert to $135/share.133 In addition, the amended
merger agreement removed a number of conditions to the merger,
including the absence of a legal constraint to closing which might
permit LVMH to refrain from closing if there was an order enjoining the agreement (one such purported order from the government
of France was at issue in the litigation).134 Finally, the parties redefined “Material Adverse Effect” in the amended agreement. The
amended definition specifically carved out any COVID-19-related
risks, thus placing COVID-related risks squarely on the shoulders
of the buyer.135 In short, after LVMH refused to close its acquisition
of Tiffany, pointing to the global pandemic, it ultimately agreed to
a face-saving, modest price reduction while giving the seller additional closing certainty and assurance that in the event of further
buyer backsliding the seller would be permitted to recoup the original merger consideration should a court be forced to award damages.
In another COVID-19 MAE/MAC case before the Delaware
Chancery Court, AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels and Resorts
One LLC,136 Vice Chancellor Laster was asked to rule when Mirae
Asset Daewoo Co. and affiliates from South Korea sought to walk
132. Amended and Restated Agreement and Plan of Merger By and Among Tiffany &
Co., LVMH Moet Hennessy-Louis Vuitton SE, Breakfast Holdings Acquisition Corp., and
Breakfast Acquisition Corp. (Form 8-K, Exhibit 2.1) (Oct. 28, 2020) [hereinafter LVMH–
Tiffany Amended Merger Agreement], https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/98246/000
119312520280456/d91099dex21.htm [https://perma.cc/KH8V-DZBP].
133. Id. § 10.6.
134. Tiffany & Co., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Oct. 28, 2020).
135. LVMH–Tiffany Amended Merger Agreement, supra note 132, § 1.1.
136. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 2020-0310-JTL,
2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
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away from an agreement to purchase certain assets from Chinese
Anbang Insurance Group. Mirae made two arguments related to
COVID-19. First, that the buyer was not required to close because
COVID-19 amounted to a MAE/MAC, causing the bringdown condition to fail. Second, that in response to COVID-19, the Anbang
Group made significant changes in its hotel business during the
executory period and thus violated its covenant to run the business
in the ordinary course between signing and closing.137
With respect to the first issue, Vice Chancellor Laster found
that, notwithstanding the fact that the parties had not negotiated
for a specific “pandemic” carveout, the carveout for “natural disasters and calamities” was sufficiently broad to cover a naturally occurring global pandemic. Thus, while COVID-19 might be a
MAE/MAC, the risk of a pandemic occurring during the executory
period was an exogenous risk that properly fell on the shoulders of
the buyer. Consequently, Mirae could not refuse to close on account
of a MAE/MAC since the bringdown condition had not failed.138
With respect to Mirae’s ordinary-course argument, however, the
court felt differently. Buyer argued that when Anbang made material changes to the operations of its businesses in response to the
pandemic, the company breached its obligation to run the business
in the ordinary course consistent with past practice. Anbang argued that it ran the business in the ordinary course given the current circumstances. The court found that the buyer had the better
of this argument and ruled that seller had breached its ordinary
course, thus permitting the buyer to refuse to close the transaction.139
Similarly, Sycamore Partners sought to terminate its February
20, 2020, merger agreement with L Brands to acquire Victoria’s
Secret. Although Sycamore considered renegotiating the merger
agreement, it sued to terminate the merger agreement after efforts
to renegotiate were rebuffed by L Brands.140 In its suit, Sycamore

137. Id. at *1.
138. Id. at *48.
139. Id.
140. James B. Stewart, The Victoria’s Secret Contract That Anticipated a Pandemic, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/29/business/victorias-secret-syca
more-coronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/523R-LTV8].
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did not attempt to argue that COVID-19 was a MAE/MAC.141 Presumably, by February 20, 2020, the prospect of a global pandemic
was reasonably foreseeable to the parties. The parties had specifically included a carveout for pandemics in their definition of
MAE/MAC.142 Although that avenue was contractually available to
Sycamore, it sought a declaratory judgment against L Brands for
violating its “ordinary course” covenant because it ceased doing
business in the ordinary course as the economy shut down, relying
on the same argument that would eventually be successful in Mirae.143 Ultimately, L Brands and Sycamore agreed to terminate the
merger agreement without further renegotiation on the price term
or litigation.144
The sudden and unexpected deceleration of economic activity in
the spring and summer of 2020 (including a 33% drop in annualized GDP in the second quarter of 2020) was not only dramatic, but
it had painful consequences that will likely persist for many years
to come.145 If COVID-19 is not a material adverse event, then likely
nothing is. Nevertheless, only a small number of transactions
(three) took the opportunity to back away from negotiated terms
and reprice their agreements. The few that did appear to be the
exception rather than the rule. In addition to L Brands (Victoria’s
Secret), only three of 258 transactions announced from January
2018 to June 2020 agreed to mutually terminate their merger
agreements.146 Indeed, more transactions appear to have been outright cancelled (four) than have been renegotiated in response to
COVID-19.147 The relative paucity of renegotiations following
141. See Verified Complaint, SP VS Buyer LP v. L Brands, Inc., No. 2020-0297, 2020 WL
1970736 (Del. Ch. Apr. 22, 2020).
142. Transaction Agreement Between SP VS Buyer LP and L Brands, Inc. (Form 8-K,
Exhibit 2.1), § 1.01 (Feb. 20, 2020), https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/701985/000095
010320003347/dp121693_ex0201.htm [https://perma.cc/WE28-HUNA].
143. Verified Complaint, supra note 141, at 1–4.
144. Carleton English, L Brands, Sycamore Partners Reach ‘Mutual Agreement’ Terminating Sale of Victoria’s Secret, BARRON’S (May 4, 2020, 5:22 PM), https://www.barrons.com
/articles/l-brands-sycamore-partners-abandon-victorias-secret-deal-51588627374 [https://
perma.cc/7XR5-CL9L].
145. Jeff Cox, Second-Quarter GDP Plunged by Worst-Ever 32.9% Amid Virus-Induced
Shutdown, CNBC (Jul. 30, 2020, 8:31 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/07/30/us-gdp-q22020-first-reading.html [https://perma.cc/27A2-9CHG].
146. Review of Merger Agreements Between January 2018 & June 2020 Valued at $500
Million or Greater (on file with author).
147. See Press Release, Hexcel, Woodward and Hexcel Announce Mutual Termination of
Merger Agreement (Apr. 6, 2020), https://investors.hexcel.com/investor-news/news-details/
2020/Woodward-and-Hexcel-Announce-Mutual-Termination-of-Merger-Agreement/default.
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COVID-19 does not suggest that the pandemic has not had an adverse effect on the business prospects of merger targets. In fact,
across most industries it most certainly has. However, it does raise
the question of why so few merger agreements have been subject
to a renegotiation, especially if the conventional wisdom suggests
that parties will often use the opportunity of an adverse shock to
pursue a renegotiation of terms.
A. Why So Few Renegotiations?
The conventional wisdom with respect to MAE/MACs is that,
when faced with an adverse event, buyers will act opportunistically
to renegotiate the terms of a pending merger agreement because
there is sufficient ambiguity around whether a buyer will be successful in litigation to make any threat to withdraw from the merger agreement credible. However, two things have happened since
IBP. First, contracting practices have changed over time. At the
time IBP was decided, the traditional MAE/MAC was prevalent in
merger contracting. Indeed, at issue in IBP itself was a traditional
MAE/MAC. The traditional MAE/MAC is more akin to a traditional force majeure contract, however, because it is so broadly
drafted. The traditional MAE/MAC engenders a good deal of ambiguity, which Vice Chancellor Strine identified as a feature, not a
bug. Where there are few or no carveouts to the MAE/MAC definition, there will be a high degree of ambiguity about what might or
might not constitute a material adverse event for purposes of permitting the buyer to terminate a transaction or decline to close a
deal.

aspx [https://perma.cc/R6NN-WN5V] (“The termination . . . is in response to the increasing
impact on both the aerospace and industrial sectors, and global markets broadly, resulting
from the health crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic.”); Press Release,
NASDAQ, Stein Mart and Kingswood Announce Mutual Termination of Merger Agreement
(Apr. 16, 2020), https://www.nasdaq.com/press-release/stein-mart-and-kingswood-announc
e-mutual-termination-of-merger-agreement-2020-04-16
[https://perma.cc/G2L6-Y3ME]
(“The termination . . . is in response to the unpredictable economic conditions resulting from
the global health crisis caused by the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, uncertainty regarding Stein Mart’s ability to satisfy the conditions to closing, and the substantial expense
to Stein Mart of soliciting shareholder approval for a transaction which is unlikely to
close.”); Texas Capital Bancshares, Inc. Announces Mutual Agreement to Terminate Proposed Merger With Independent Bank Group, Inc., YAHOO! FIN. (May 26, 2020), https://fin
ance.yahoo.com/news/texas-capital-bancshares-inc-announces-110010372.html [https://pe
rma.cc/YU88-8TU5] (stating that the termination was due to “the significant impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic on global markets and on the companies’ ability to fully realize the
benefits they expected to achieve through the merger.”).
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Where the MAE/MAC is deployed in its traditional form without
carveouts, the attendant high degree of ambiguity gives rise to incentives to litigate and therefore renegotiate in the face of an adverse event, even if the event is not obviously a MAE/MAC. This is
consistent with the conventional wisdom with respect to how parties to a merger agreement will manage pre-closing adverse
shocks.
However, over time, contracting practices have changed, and the
work that the MAE/MAC does has changed as well. Rather than
act as a force majeure/frustration clause, the MAE/MAC has taken
on an altogether different role. The effect of the carveouts and disproportionate-effect language has flipped the MAE/MAC on its
head. No longer does the MAE/MAC permit the buyer to terminate
a merger contract due to a force majeure event. In fact, the buyer
is required to close the transaction in spite of force majeure events
given the modern MAE/MAC formulation. Rather, the modern
MAE/MAC only permits the buyer to terminate the merger contract in the event an adverse shock endogenous to the seller occurs
between signing and closing (as in Akorn).
A study from 1998–2005 found that 9% of transactions in the
study sample suffered a MAE/MAC. MAE/MAC clauses in that
study were mostly traditional MAE/MAC clauses or had few carveouts. These traditional MAE/MAC clauses, or slim MAE/MAC
clauses, were responsible for 80% of all deal renegotiations leading
to reductions in deal prices that averaged 15%.148 The conventional
wisdom suggests that following the COVID-19 outbreak, buyers
should take the opportunity to renegotiate terms of transactions to
reflect new, lower valuations, like they did during the 1998–2005
period. However, there have been relatively few such renegotiations. The reasons for this may be twofold. First, parties who seek
to renegotiate systematically overestimate litigation costs as well
as the likelihood of successfully arguing an exogenous event like
COVID-19 is an adverse event within the definition of a modern
MAE/MAC. Consequently, buyers and sellers who do not renegotiate understand that threats to litigate lack credibility because buyers are extremely unlikely to succeed. Absent a credible threat of
buyer contract failure, sellers appear willing to force buyers to accept even inefficient transactions that represent a net loss in terms

148. Denis & Macias, supra note 23, at 819–21 (finding that MACs are responsible for
80% of renegotiations of merger agreements).
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of transaction surplus and distribution of rents to the seller rather
than to agree to share the cost of losses during the executory period. Second, the modern MAE/MAC has a very different role in the
merger agreement. Over time, what started as a force majeure/
frustration clause has flipped on its head to more tightly commit a
buyer to complete a transaction by drastically narrowing the scope
of permissible excuse from performance.
In the context of a traditional MAE/MAC, a pandemic like
COVID-19 is an axiomatic adverse event, and thus should be a
credible lever to force a renegotiation. However, given the fundamental transformation of the role of the MAE/MAC clause in merger agreements since the landmark 2001 MAE/MAC case, IBP, this
is no longer the case. The MAE/MAC at issue in IBP, consistent
with the time, was a traditional MAE/MAC with no carveouts. Vice
Chancellor Strine observed that such a “provision is best read as a
backstop protecting the acquiror from the occurrence of unknown
events that substantially threaten the overall earnings potential of
the target in a durationally-significant manner.”149 He also prognosticated that interpreting a traditional MAE/MAC in any other
manner would “encourage the negotiation of extremely detailed
‘MAC’ clauses with numerous carve-outs or qualifiers. An approach
that reads broad clauses as addressing fundamental events that
would materially affect the value of a target to a reasonable acquiror eliminates the need for drafting of that sort.”150 However,
subsequent development of the MAE/MAC clause in practice suggests the Vice Chancellor got that exactly backwards. The inherent
vagueness of a broadly written traditional MAE/MAC creates an
incentive for parties to transform MAE/MAC terms from a broad,
buyer-friendly force majeure/frustration clause to a provision that
allocates exogenous risk explicitly to the buyer.
The structure of MAE/MAC clauses deployed prior to IBP suggests that MAE/MAC clauses were still playing the role of force
majeure/frustration clauses at that time. Given that exogenous
events are captured within the definition of force majeure clauses,
there is significant indefiniteness about what may constitute a
MAE/MAC. Consequently, traditional MAE/MAC clauses are a

149. In re IBP, Inc. S’holders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 68 n.155 (Del. Ch. 2001).
150. Id.
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credible lever for forcing renegotiations, even inefficient renegotiations that impose the costs of adverse exogenous events on sellers.
However, since IBP in 2001, practice has transitioned away from
the traditional MAE/MAC towards a broad adoption of modern
MAE/MAC clauses with their extensive use of carveouts.151
Very few, if any, merger agreements now rely on traditional
MAE/MACs. This represents a dramatic transformation of the
MAE/MAC clause over the past two decades.152 The modern
MAE/MAC, with its large number of carveouts, is a relatively recent development. For example, in the classic 1975 tome on merger
agreements Anatomy of a Merger by James Freund, there is barely
a passing reference to the role of MAE/MAC clauses.153 The 2001
ABA Model Asset Purchase Agreement, which acts as a template
for many practicing lawyers, proffers a traditional definition of a
MAE/MAC for its model agreement.154 The salient points for discussion for the model agreement relate not to carveouts or semiendogenous risks, but to whether or not the addition of “prospects”
to the traditional definition of a MAE/MAC is appropriate. The
commentary to the Model Agreement suggests that sellers may attempt to negotiate one or more of the following carveouts:
(i) any change resulting from conditions affecting the industry in
which Seller operates or from changes in general business or economic
conditions; (ii) any change resulting from the announcement or pendency of any of the transactions contemplated by this Agreement; or
(iii) any change resulting from compliance by Seller with the terms of,
151. This phenomenon is consistent with the observation by Professor Jennejohn of
“mass customization” of merger agreements within merger practice. Matthew Jennejohn,
The Architecture of Contract Innovation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 71, 72 (2018). Professor Mitu Gulati
et al. also observe similar phenomena with respect to the development of the use of specificperformance provisions in merger agreements since 2001. See Theresa Arnold, Amanda
Dixon, Hadar Tanne, Madison Sherrill & Mitu Gulati, Lipstick on a Pig: Specific Performance Clauses in Action, __ WIS. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2021).
152. The phenomenon of contractual innovation, particularly with respect to the development of merger agreements, has been the subject of a good deal of recent serious study.
See, e.g., Jennejohn, supra note 151, at 72–73; Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal
Structure, 113 NW. L. REV. 279 (2018); Robert Anderson & Jeffrey Manns, The Inefficient
Evolution of Merger Agreements, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 57 (2017); Stephen J. Choi, Mitu
Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Black Hole Problem in Commercial Boilerplate, 67 DUKE L.J.
1 (2017); John C. Coates, IV, Why Have M&A Contracts Grown? Evidence from Twenty Years
of Deals (Harvard Law Sch. John M. Olin Ctr., Discussion Paper No. 889, 2016), https://pap
ers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2862019 [https://perma.cc/VU9F-QZQT].
153. JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER 259–61 (1975) (discussing the “Absence
of Certain Changes” representation).
154. MODEL ASSET PURCHASE AGREEMENT WITH COMMENTARY § 3.15 (AM. BAR ASS’N
2001).
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or the taking of any action contemplated or permitted by, this Agreement.155

Indeed, the commentary suggests that, if a buyer agrees to one
or more of these proposed carveouts, the buyer should insist that
the carveout be subject not to the now-common disproportionateeffect language but to a “standard of proof” that the adverse change
“was proximately caused by one of the circumstances” described in
the carveout.156
In their 2001 article, Professors Gilson and Schwartz observed
the beginnings of a shift in contracting practice away from the traditional MAE/MAC. In the merger contracts they identified from
1993, only 18.33% included one or two carveouts from the traditional MAE/MAC definition; more than half identified only one
carveout.157 In 1995, 31.7% of the transactions Gilson and
Schwartz identified included more than one carveout.158 By 2000,
they identified carveouts in 83% of transactions in their dataset,
with an average of only 3.75 carveouts per transaction.159 Consistent with their view that assignment of exogenous risk to the
buyer is an efficient device to mitigate seller moral hazard, Professors Gilson and Schwartz argued that the use of carveouts should
be concentrated in technology acquisitions where information
asymmetries between buyer and seller are more obvious.160 However, subsequent developments suggest more widespread acceptance of MAE/MAC carveouts. A 2012 MAE/MAC study by Professors Denis and Macias, relying on data from 1998–2005,
observed that the vast majority of merger agreements had few, if
any, carveouts from the MAE/MAC definition.161 Professors Denis

155. Id. § 3.15 cmt.
156. Id. (responding to the criticism of the MAE/MAC as being a vague contract term).
157. Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 350.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 350, 354. Kenneth Adams also observed in 2004 that the extensive use of
carveouts to MAEs was common in technology-sector acquisitions but not broader. See Adams, supra note 32, at 43–45.
161. Denis & Macias, supra note 23, at 825. Denis and Macias document the presence of
MAE/MACs and carveouts in merger agreements in their sample:
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and Macias’s data included no MAE/MAC clauses with carveouts
for pandemics, force majeure, or acts of God.162
By 2019, there was a near-complete transition away from the
traditional MAE/MAC and adoption across all sectors of M&A
practice of modern MAE/MAC clauses. Survey data from 2019 of
U.S. public company deals greater than $1 billion found that
MAE/MAC clauses had an average of more than fourteen carveouts
with a high degree of uniformity across industries.163 In addition
to the increase in reliance on contracts, transition to modern
MAE/MAC clauses also includes the use of disproportionate-effect
language, which permits consideration of an exogenous effect otherwise excluded by a carveout if it disproportionately affects the
target. Survey data in 2009 and 2010 saw 48% and 40% of transactions relying on such language. In 2019, 87% of public company
transactions included disproportionate-effect language.164 Similarly, 2019 survey data showed that 82% of public deals larger than
$1 billion included carveouts for acts of God and 19% included
carveouts for calamities.165 Professors Jennejohn, Nyarko, and Talley conducted a review of over 1700 transactions between 2003 and
2020 for incidence of carveouts related to pandemics.166 Although
they found the incidence of a specific carveout for pandemics to be
relatively low, they noted a trend over time to increase the number

Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

% with MAE/MAC
100.00%
98.8%
99.2%
97.9%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
100.0%
99.3%

% with Carveouts
60.4%
61.1%
75.6%
85.4%
90.9%
93.4%
91.4%
97.7%
75.6%

Aver Carveouts
2.8
2.7
3.8
4.4
5.4
5.3
6.0
7.2
4.0

162. Id.
163. NIXON PEABODY, MAC SURVEY: NP 2019 REPORT 7 (2019), https://www.nixonpeabo
dy.com/-/media/Files/PDF-Others/mac-survey-2019-nixon-peabody.ashx?la=en [https://per
ma.cc/Y77B-E7PB].
164. Id. at 4.
165. Id. at 9.
166. Matthew Jennejohn, Julian Nyarko & Eric Talley, COVID-19 As a Force Majeure in
Corporate Transactions 1–3 (Columbia Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 625, 2020), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3577701 [https://perma.cc/N7DG-N2NW].
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of carveouts, including carveouts for pandemics. By 2019, they
found that 23% of transactions in their sample included carveouts
for pandemics.167
This author’s own review of merger agreements with Delaware
target corporations signed between January 2018 and June 2020
valued at least $500 million produced a broad sample of MAE/MAC
clauses, including a number that covered the period after COVID19 entered the world stage. Many of the MAE/MAC clauses include
carveouts directly or reasonably applicable to the COVID-19 outbreak, including carveouts for epidemics or pandemics, national
emergencies, as well as carveouts covering force majeure generally.
The use of disproportionate-impact language to carve-in pandemics in the event the impact on the target was disproportionate to
the industry in which the target operates was nearly universal.

COVID-19 RELATED CARVEOUTS
Epidemic (and variations)

67 (25.9%)

Force Majeure

120 (46.5%)

National Emergency

17 (6.6%)

Disproportionate-Impact Language

254 (98.4%)

Where the merger agreement includes a pandemic, national
emergency, act of God, or other force majeure event as a carveout,
the occurrence of such an event, without more, would not be permitted to form the basis of a claim that there has been an
MAE/MAC unless the target is disproportionately affected by the
pandemic.
The transition from traditional MAE/MAC clauses with few, if
any, carveouts to modern MAE/MAC clauses with many carveouts
and disproportionate-effects language was relatively rapid. Following IBP, what had been a niche contracting practice of including a
large number of carveouts, limited mostly to technology company
acquisitions, became much more diffuse and was adopted by merger agreements across all sectors.168 The effect of this shift was to

167. Id. at 5 (Finding that, in part, the relatively low number of pandemic carveouts can
be tied to a lack of salience).
168. In their study of the evolution of merger agreements, Professors Anderson and

QUINN 552 (DO NOT DELETE)

2021]

2/10/2021 10:08 PM

MERGERS, MACS, AND COVID-19

605

turn the MAE/MAC clause on its head. Traditional MAE/MAC
clauses leave the risk of most durationally significant, exogenous,
adverse events with sellers rather than buyers. On the other hand,
the addition of carveouts and disproportionate-effects language
shifts the risk of exogenous adverse events onto buyers and leaves
the risk of only endogenous and semi-endogenous events with the
seller.
By any measure, the MAE/MAC that LVMH and Tiffany negotiated in their agreement is an example of a modern MAE/MAC.
LVMH and Tiffany included nine specific carveouts to their definition of a MAE/MAC, including specific carveouts against changes
in “general economic or political conditions,” against “any change
in Law applicable to the Company’s business,” against the occurrence of “any hurricane, tornado, flood, earthquake, or other natural disaster,” as well as specific carveouts against adverse effects
attributable to
geopolitical conditions, the outbreak or escalation of hostilities (including the Hong Kong protests and the “Yellow Vest” movement [in
France]), any acts of war (whether or not declared), sabotage (including cyberattacks) or terrorism, or any escalation or worsening of any
such acts of hostilities, war, sabotage, or terrorism threatened or underway . . . .”169

With respect to the agreement’s more specific carveouts that
touch on a number of salient issues known at the time of the agreement’s November 24, 2019, signing (e.g., the Hong Kong protests
and the Yellow Vest movement in France), the parties included
carveouts to specify that those known adverse events would not
come under the definition of a MAE/MAC for purposes of permitting the buyer to terminate the merger agreement. Notably, the
parties did not include a specific carveout for pandemics or other
acts of God in their merger agreement.170 Arguably, general carveouts against adverse changes in economic conditions or adverse
changes in laws should be sufficient to cover the effects of a pandemic on Tiffany’s business. However, it does not necessarily follow

Manns argue that evolution of deal terms is path-dependent and eschews deal term standardization. The experience of the evolution of MAE/MAC clauses suggests that, at least with
this term, deal term standardization and rapid evolution is certainly possible in merger
agreements. Anderson & Manns, supra note 152, at 61.
169. LVMH–Tiffany Merger Agreement, supra note 123, § 1.1.
170. Id. at art. I.
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that the parties intended to allocate exogenous pandemic risk,
should it occur, to the seller.
Because the modern MAE/MAC allocates adverse endogenous
risks to the seller and exogenous risks to the buyer, a more reasonable reading of a modern MAE/MAC would be one that assigns unforeseeable exogenous adverse shocks to the buyer and not the
seller. Not only would this be consistent with doctrines of excuse
like frustration and impracticability, which require the risk be unforeseen by the parties, but it would be consistent with current understanding of the MAE/MAC provision’s purpose.171
While the appearance of pandemics like COVID-19 from time to
time is entirely foreseeable, their actual appearance is stochastic
and obviously not within the control of either buyer or seller. The
pandemic is, in that sense, the archetypical exogenous event. Allocating the risk of a pandemic to a target because the parties failed
to specifically enumerate it on a list of carveouts is inefficient, as a
buyer is in the best position to bear the cost of the appearance of a
pandemic between signing and closing. It is also inconsistent with
the purpose of the modern MAE/MAC provision in merger agreements. Any other result would irrationally reward a buyer who,
during the executory period, is “lucky enough” to suffer a pandemic
rather than any other specified exogenous risk. To the extent there
remains vagueness in the modern MAE/MAC term, particularly
the carveouts, parties could resolve this by being more explicit in
their drafting: allocating exogenous risks to the buyer and endogenous and semi-endogenous risks to the seller. If not, then, contra
Vice Chancellor Strine, drafters face an incentive to add additional
carveouts to the ever-increasing list of carveouts, constrained only
by the drafters’ imagination.172

171. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 Del. Ch. LEXIS
325, at *133–34 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018) (“Consistent with standard practice in the M&A
industry, the plain language of the Merger Agreement’s definition of a Material Adverse
Effect generally allocates the risk of endogenous, business-specific events to [the seller] and
exogenous, systematic risks to [the buyer].”).
172. Because most such carveouts will necessarily cover low-probability events, the present value to the buyer of accepting such risks should be low, e.g., carveouts for meteor
strikes, etc., leading to a potential explosion in negotiated carveouts. In Mirae, Vice Chancellor Laster threaded the needle by ruling that “natural disaster” and “calamity” were sufficiently broad as to encompass pandemics such as COVID-19 for purposes of the carveout
to the MAE/MAC. AB Stable VIII LLC v. MAPS Hotels & Resorts One LLC, C.A. No. 20200310-JTL, 2020 Del. Ch. LEXIS 353, at *48 (Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2020).
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B. When Should One Expect a Renegotiation?
Although the crux of the conventional wisdom’s argument is that
the MAE/MAC gives rise to renegotiations, one must note that although an adverse shock may generate a motivation for buyers to
renegotiate, buyers have extremely limited ability to generate
credible threats to terminate transactions. In the past, when traditional MAE/MACs were more prevalent, every adverse shock
could give rise to a potentially credible termination threat and then
subsequent renegotiation. However, modern MAE/MACs presently
make up the vast majority of MAE/MAC clauses in merger agreements. Consequently, adverse exogenous shocks that occur between signing and closing, like the COVID-19 outbreak, will not be
of the type to generate a credible claim for a MAE/MAC. Therefore,
buyer threats to terminate transactions due to adverse events like
COVID-19 are not credible. To the extent a buyer threatens to terminate a transaction due to adverse exogenous shock, such a renegotiation will most likely involve the buyer forcing the seller’s
shareholders to bear at least some of the cost of the shock, which
would be inefficient unless the shock represented a semi-endogenous risk.173 Consequently, although the conventional wisdom suggests that the MAE/MAC provision can act as a fulcrum for renegotiation following an adverse shock during the executory period,
one should not expect such renegotiations to be plentiful. To the
extent there are renegotiations, one should expect they will be relatively few in number and limited to the following three categories:
adverse endogenous shocks, adverse semi-endogenous shocks, and
inefficient renegotiations.
Adverse Endogenous Shocks. Following Akorn, it is clear that
there is relatively little ambiguity surrounding the interpretation
of modern MAE/MAC clauses: courts will enforce them where they
involve adverse endogenous and semi-endogenous shocks. Adverse
exogenous shocks, like the COVID-19 outbreak, will not trigger a
buyer’s right to terminate and their occurrence does not generate
a credible termination threat sufficient to initiate a renegotiation.
On the other hand, where the seller has experienced an adverse
endogenous risk between signing and closing, a buyer’s claim to a
MAE/MAC is credible. In such situations, both sides’ positions may
be improved by a renegotiation of the merger agreement’s terms

173.

Gilson & Schwartz, supra note 7, at 339.
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compared to the alternative, which would have the buyer lose access to the seller and leave the seller to fend for itself—or even
fail—without a transaction.174 For example, following the announcement of its merger agreement with Verizon in 2016, Yahoo
disclosed a massive data breach.175 As a result of the data breach,
Verizon threatened to declare a MAE/MAC and walk away from
the transaction unless Yahoo renegotiated the terms of the sale.
Verizon’s threat was clearly credible. The data breach was material and it was a risk endogenous to Yahoo and no one else. The
cost of the breach should properly have been borne by the seller.
The subsequent renegotiation reduced the consideration to Yahoo
shareholders by $350 million and the transaction moved to closing.176
The Akorn–Fresenius transaction involved an endogenous adverse event (disclosure of fraud internal to the target).177 The effect
of the adverse disclosure was to significantly reduce Fresenius’s
valuation of Akorn. Post-disclosure, Akorn was not worth nearly
what had been offered. Subsequent to the disclosure, a termination
threat by Fresenius should have been credible. Had Fresenius initiated a renegotiation, it would have reflected a revised valuation
for Akorn and would have been efficient relative to the alternative
of termination.
The Forescout–Advent renegotiation is another example of this
dynamic playing out. Epidemics and pandemics were clearly
carved out from the MAE/MAC definition in the merger agreement. Ultimately, COVID-19 likely did not create the circumstances that permitted a renegotiation, although the pandemic
likely was responsible for the buyer reevaluating its valuation of
174. See Olivia Rockman & Jeff Feeley, Akorn Seeks Bankruptcy After Failed Takeover,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2020, 6:52 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-0212/akorn-pursues-sale-and-process-may-include-bankruptcy-filing [https://perma.cc/2K4PRULJ].
175. Steven Davidoff Solomon, How Yahoo’s Data Breach Could Affect Its Deal with Verizon, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/24/business/dealbook/
how-yahoos-data-breach-could-affect-its-deal-with-verizon.html [https://perma.cc/9WQ7-R
QG4]; David Shepardson, Verizon Says Yahoo Hack “Material,” Could Affect Deal, REUTERS
(Oct. 13, 2016, 2:38 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-verizon-yahoo-cyber-idUSK
CN12D2PW [https://perma.cc/UE5S-7XE3]; Ingrid Lunden, After Data Breaches, Verizon
Knocks $350M Off Yahoo Sale, Now Valued at $4.48B, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 21, 2017, 8:34
AM), https://techcrunch.com/2017/02/21/verizon-knocks-350m-off-yahoo-sale-after-data-bre
aches-now-valued-at-4-48b/ [https://perma.cc/HB97-UY5N].
176. Lunden, supra note 175.
177. Rockman & Feeley, supra note 174.
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the company. Rather, the claimed appearance of whistleblower allegations of financial improprieties represented an endogenous adverse event during the executory period. Advent’s threat not to
close the transaction was credible not due to the pandemic but due
to the appearance of an endogenous risk. Rather than litigate, the
parties renegotiated the terms, with Forescout shareholders absorbing the cost of the exogenous adverse event. To the extent the
whistleblower allegations were real, this result was an efficient result for both buyer and seller, because it forced the seller to disclose
otherwise private information rather than risk litigating in the
manner described by Choi and Triantis.178
Adverse Semi-Endogenous Shocks. Similarly, adverse semi-endogenous shocks can be the credible impetus for efficient renegotiations. For example, LVMH argued that Tiffany’s suffered a semiendogenous adverse shock due to COVID-19. LVMH claimed that
COVID-19 reduced Tiffany’s valuation to a degree disproportionate
with its peers due to the placement of Tiffany’s retail locations in
malls and dependence on tourism-based trade. If true, LVMH
would have been in a position to credibly threaten termination or
initiate an efficient renegotiation of the terms of the transaction.
Inefficient Renegotiations. While renegotiation in the face of endogenous and semi-endogenous adverse shocks will likely be efficient, there is also a category of inefficient renegotiations that are
possible because the threat of buyer contract failure in response to
an adverse exogenous event is credible. In such scenarios, the renegotiations are likely going to be inefficient because the buyer will
force the target company’s shareholders to bear the cost of the
buyer’s potential contract failure through a redistribution of the
merger agreement’s terms. For most strategic acquirors, the prospect of contract failure due to an adverse exogenous event is extremely rare. However, for financial buyers relying on thinly capitalized shell corporations at arm’s length from the transaction
sponsor, the prospect of contract failure due to an adverse exogenous event during the executory period that cuts off access to
lender financing is not necessarily a remote prospect.179

178. Choi & Triantis, supra note 23, at 859.
179. See Steven M. Davidoff, The Failure of Private Equity, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 510–
12 (2009); Brian JM Quinn, Optionality in Merger Agreements, 35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 817–
20 (2009).
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CONCLUSION
Although the conventional wisdom suggests that, following adverse shocks like the worldwide COVID-19 pandemic, parties to
merger agreements would have leaned on MAE/MAC provisions to
preserve those agreements by renegotiating the terms, in fact, following the rapid onset of COVID-19 there was no rush to the renegotiation table by parties to merger agreements. The relative paucity of renegotiations suggests that the conventional wisdom either
misunderstands the role of the modern MAE/MAC or at least overestimates the degree of ambiguity that surrounds current enforcement of the provision. Courts as well as drafters have adopted an
approach that reflects the view offered by Professors Gilson and
Schwartz that modern MAE/MAC provisions no longer function as
force majeure clauses providing buyers the ability to walk away
from transactions. Rather, modern MAE/MAC provisions allocate
exogenous adverse risks to the buyer while making sellers responsible for adverse endogenous risks that might appear during the
executory period.
Where adverse exogenous events appear, sellers have very
strong contractual claims to enforcement of the merger agreement
and consequently no incentive to pursue renegotiation of the merger terms. To the extent adverse endogenous or semi-endogenous
risks present themselves during the executory period, parties still
have incentives to efficiently renegotiate the contract terms and
can do so. Similarly, where the buyer faces the prospect of contract
failure as a result of an adverse exogenous risk, sellers may prefer
renegotiating to enforcing their contract rights.
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APPENDIX: REPRESENTATIVE MAE
The material adverse effect clause in Advent’s February 2020
acquisition of Forescout is representative. It reads as follows:
“Company Material Adverse Effect” means any change,
event, violation, inaccuracy, effect or circumstance (each, an “Effect”) that, individually or taken together with all other Effects
that exist or have occurred prior to the date of determination of the
occurrence of the Company Material Adverse Effect, (A) has had or
would reasonably be expected to have a material adverse effect on
the business, financial condition or results of operations of the
Company and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole; or (B) would reasonably be expected to prevent or materially impair or delay the
consummation of the Merger, it being understood that, in the case
of clause (A) or clause (B), none of the following (by itself or when
aggregated) will be deemed to be or constitute a Company Material
Adverse Effect or will be taken into account when determining
whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has occurred or may,
would or could occur (subject to the limitations set forth below):
(i) changes in general economic conditions in the United States or
any other country or region in the world, or changes in conditions in
the global economy generally (except to the extent that such Effect has
had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to other companies of a similar size operating in the industries
in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which
case only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be
taken into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company Material Adverse Effect);
(ii) changes in conditions in the financial markets, credit markets
or capital markets in the United States or any other country or region
in the world, including (A) changes in interest rates or credit ratings
in the United States or any other country; (B) changes in exchange
rates for the currencies of any country; or (C) any suspension of trading in securities (whether equity, debt, derivative or hybrid securities)
generally on any securities exchange or over-the-counter market operating in the United States or any other country or region in the
world (except, in each case, to the extent that such Effect has had a
materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to
other companies of a similar size operating in the industries in which
the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case
only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken
into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company
Material Adverse Effect);
(iii) changes in conditions in the industries in which the Company
and its Subsidiaries conduct business (except to the extent that such
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Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the
Company relative to other companies of a similar size operating in the
industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company Material Adverse Effect);
(iv) changes in regulatory, legislative or political conditions (including the imposition or adjustment of tariffs) in the United States or any
other country or region in the world (except to the extent that such
Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect on the
Company relative to other companies of similar size operating in the
industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company Material Adverse Effect);
(v) any geopolitical conditions, outbreak of hostilities, acts of war,
sabotage, terrorism or military actions (including any escalation or
general worsening of any such hostilities, acts of war, sabotage, terrorism or military actions) in the United States or any other country
or region in the world (except to the extent that such Effect has had a
materially disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to
other companies of similar size operating in the industries in which
the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case
only the incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken
into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company
Material Adverse Effect);
(vi) earthquakes, hurricanes, tsunamis, tornadoes, floods, mudslides, wild fires or other natural disasters, weather conditions, epidemics, pandemics and other force majeure events in the United
States or any other country or region in the world (except to the extent
that such Effect has had a materially disproportionate adverse effect
on the Company relative to other companies of similar size operating
in the industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct
business, in which case only the incremental disproportionate adverse
impact may be taken into account in determining whether there has
occurred a Company Material Adverse Effect) (emphasis added);
(vii) any Effect resulting from the announcement of this Agreement
or the pendency of the Merger, including the impact thereof on the
relationships, contractual or otherwise, of the Company and its Subsidiaries with employees, suppliers, customers, partners, vendors,
Governmental Authorities or any other third Person (other than for
purposes of any representation and warranty contained in Section
3.5);
(viii) the compliance (other than compliance with the covenant to
operate in the ordinary course of business pursuant to Section 5.1) by
any Party with the terms of this Agreement, including any action
taken or refrained from being taken pursuant to or in accordance with
this Agreement;
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(ix) any action taken or refrained from being taken, in each case to
which Parent has expressly approved, consented to or requested in
writing (including via email) following the date of this Agreement;
(x) changes or proposed changes in GAAP or other accounting standards or applicable Law (or the enforcement or interpretation of any of
the foregoing) or changes in the regulatory accounting requirements
applicable to any industry in which the Company and its Subsidiaries
operate (except to the extent that such Effect has had a materially
disproportionate adverse effect on the Company relative to other companies of a similar size operating in the industries in which the Company and its Subsidiaries conduct business, in which case only the
incremental disproportionate adverse impact may be taken into account in determining whether there has occurred a Company Material
Adverse Effect);
(xi) changes in the price or trading volume of the Company Common Stock, in each case in and of itself (it being understood that any
cause of such change may be deemed to constitute, in and of itself, a
Company Material Adverse Effect and may be taken into consideration when determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect
has occurred);
(xii) any failure, in and of itself, by the Company and its Subsidiaries to meet (A) any public estimates or expectations of the Company’s revenue, earnings or other financial performance or results of
operations for any period; or (B) any internal budgets, plans, projections or forecasts of its revenues, earnings or other financial performance or results of operations (it being understood that any cause of
any such failure may be deemed to constitute, in and of itself, a Company Material Adverse Effect and may be taken into consideration
when determining whether a Company Material Adverse Effect has
occurred);
(xiii) the availability or cost of equity, debt or other financing to
Parent or Merger Sub;
(xiv) any Transaction Litigation or other Legal Proceeding threatened, made or brought by any of the current or former Company Stockholders (on their own behalf or on behalf of the Company) against the
Company, any of its executive officers or other employees or any member of the Company Board arising out of the Merger or any other
transaction contemplated by this Agreement; and
(xv) any matters expressly disclosed in the Company Disclosure
Letter.
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